

THE IMPACT TO NATO AND THE UNITED STATES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION'S MILITARY
RAPID-REACTION FORCE

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Strategy

by

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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT TO NATO AND THE UNITED STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S MILITARY RAPID-REACTION FORCE, by MAJ Peter E. Goldfein, 91 pages.

In 1999 the European Union (EU) established goals of fielding by 2003 a 60,000-troop force, deployable within sixty days and sustainable for up to one year. The force will be used for so-called "Petersberg" tasks, that is, humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The goals were spurred by European desires to have a crisis-response force which could act autonomously from NATO if necessary. This thesis explores the potential impact to NATO and the US of the EU's efforts to develop its crisis-reaction force. The research explores the military relationships between the EU force and NATO, EU plans for military modernization, the possible effects of expansion of both organizations, and EU intentions vis a vis NATO. The EU will require NATO assistance for all but the simplest Petersberg missions in the near term, and must continue to improve ties with NATO to that end. Despite the costs the EU rapid-reaction force imposes on NATO in terms of staff man-hours, more complex command and control, and increased training requirements, the net results for the US and NATO should be positive: improved trans-Atlantic relations and continued relevance for NATO.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
LIST OF FIGURES	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vi
 CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW	13
3. EU RAPID REACTION FORCE INTERACTION WITH NATO	25
4. EU PLANS FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION	39
5. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF EU AND NATO EXPANSION	52
6. EU INTENTIONS WITH REGARDS TO NATO	64
7. CONCLUSIONS	75
REFERENCE LIST	85
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	91
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT.....	92

FIGURES

	Page
1. EU force commitments to ESDP as of November 2000	28
2. Allocation of votes for “qualified majority” decisions in the Council of Ministers	54

ABBREVIATIONS

AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force headquarters (NATO)
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity (NATO initiative)
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy (EU initiative)
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
J-STARS	Joint Surveillance Tracking and Reconnaissance System
MAP	Membership Action Plan (NATO)
MC	Military Committee (EU)
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PfP	Partnership for Peace (NATO)
PSC	Political and Security Committee (EU)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
UN	United Nations
WEU	Western European Union

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In terms of European collective defense policy, the Helsinki summit of December 1999 was a watershed event. Briefly summarized, the summit affirmed the European Union's (EU) intent to field a 50,000 to 60,000-troop force, up to fifteen brigades, able to deploy with sixty-days notice, and sustain operations for one year for stability, peacekeeping, and humanitarian type operations, also known in Europe as "Petersburg" missions, within the European area of influence (Van Ham 2000, 11). This agreement by the EU represents the first such initiative outside of the Western European Union (WEU), which was more focused in scope and membership.

This EU initiative brings with it both practical and political issues. One of the main incentives for the EU to establish an autonomous force was United States dominance of the 1999 air campaign in Kosovo. European inability to field all-weather precision strike aircraft and dependence on US intelligence sources rendered them subordinate to US efforts. Furthermore, US initial reluctance to become involved could have limited North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces available for participation, and gave the EU cause for concern for future crises where they would like to act outside of US interests, but still required US military assistance (Van Ham 2000, 8-9). Without a responsive autonomous force, the EU will remain tied to US desires.

Problem Statement

Politically this EU initiative has highlighted the evolutionary process underway for NATO and the EU. It has also forced dialogue on the roles of the members on both sides of the Atlantic. This dialogue centers on concerns for an autonomous Europe

“decoupling” from the US and thereby destabilizing the region and on concerns over “US hegemony” which drive a need for a more balanced EU military capability (Powaski, 2001).

On the practical side, in addition to the aforementioned EU shortfalls identified by the Kosovo campaign, outside NATO the EU lacks strategic air and sealift, and efficient command and control structures (Bonnart 2001). In fact, the EU force realistically must rely on NATO for these functions in the short-term. Only with significant commitment from EU nations will it be able to develop autonomous capabilities as the force develops. As of January 2001, the EU had acknowledged that the French idea of a military command structure completely separate from NATO was unsupportable (Powaski 2001). What non-NATO capabilities the EU has in place today are largely in the context of the WEU.

Thesis Question

The significance of these developments hinges on their impact on NATO and the US. If the impact is positive or neutral, European stability will improve or proceed unaffected specifically by these military initiatives. If the impact is negative, European stability and the ability of the US to influence events in Europe will suffer. This research will investigate the implications of this EU initiative for NATO and the US. Ultimately, how will the EU policy regarding its emerging 60,000-troop European rapid reaction force affect NATO, which has been a stabilizing force in Europe for over fifty years?

Subordinate Questions

The following questions must be addressed to evaluate the thesis question:

1. How much will NATO intertwine with the proposed EU forces in terms of command networks, and military resources?
2. How aggressively will the EU pursue the economic changes required to develop a genuinely autonomous military capability?
3. What are the potential impacts of EU and NATO expansion on the EU ability to employ military forces?
4. What is the intention of the EU with regards to NATO as it brings its own “Petersburg” force into being?

Background

The Paris Agreements of 1954 created the WEU by modifying the Brussels Treaty (March, 1948) to allow Germany and Italy to join Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom for the purpose of collective security. The establishment of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the emergence of NATO overshadowed the WEU for many years, only to have it re-emerge following the “Rome Declaration” (October, 1984) with stated purposes of defining a European Security Identity and harmonizing members’ defense policies. At the St. Malo Summit (December, 1998) France and the United Kingdom declared the WEU’s need for a credible military force autonomous from NATO. NATO’s Washington Summit (April, 1999) reaffirmed NATO support for WEU forces and agreements for use of NATO resources for situations where NATO is not “engaged militarily as an alliance.” Since 1954 the WEU added Greece, Portugal, and Spain as full members, with the remaining

members of the EU as “observers,” and the remaining members of NATO (except the US and Canada) as “associate members” (www.weu.int, 9 Sep 01).

For comparison it is worthwhile to summarize Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty (The North Atlantic Treaty) and Article V of the WEU’s 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty, and to provide further background on the term “Petersberg Tasks.” Article 5 of NATO’s source document, the 1949 Washington Treaty, calls for signatory nations to regard an armed attack on any member in Europe or North America as an attack against all; but allows each nation to respond as it sees fit under the self-defense criteria of Article 51 of the United Nations charter. NATO members under Article 5 can provide mutual support with measures up to and including an armed response (Washington Treaty 1949, Article 5).

Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty (signed in Paris in 1954) provides members of the WEU more explicit guidance. In the event of an armed attack on a WEU member in Europe, other WEU members are obliged to provide the attacked party all the military and other aid and assistance in their power, again in the context of collective defense as described by Article 51 of the United Nations charter (Modified Brussels Treaty 1954, Article V).

While it is not inappropriate to envision a variety of military operations other than war as “Petersberg Tasks,” the term’s actual background came from tasks described at the June 1992 WEU summit in Petersberg Germany, and whose definition was subsequently adopted into Article 17 of the EU’s 1997 Amsterdam treaty. Essentially, “Petersberg Tasks” are shorthand for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of

combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/dev-esdi.htm). The Petersburg Declaration (June, 1992) created a mission set for WEU forces outside of the established collective defense concept of Article V of its 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty. The Petersburg Declaration also stated that the WEU might support conflict-prevention and crisis management operations of the UN Security Council. At the same time, the Declaration supported a strong transatlantic partnership (www.eu.int, 9 Sep 01).

Understanding the differences between NATO Article 5, WEU Article V, and the background of the Petersberg Tasks provides a framework to understand the seven multinational military organizations with agreements to support the WEU for collective defense or for Petersberg Tasks. The forces of each of these organizations are trained and equipped by national governments. These forces include the EUROCORPS, the Multinational Division (Central), the United Kingdom-Netherlands Amphibious Force, the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, the 1st German-Netherlands Corps, and the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (www.weu.int, 9 Sep 01). In addition to other multinational military arrangements within Europe, these seven forces were made available to the WEU to provide a flexible range of military options to that body (Editors, *Military Technology*, April 2000).

Begun at a French-German summit in May 1992, the EUROCORPS force now contains troops from France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg. A force of approximately 60,000, it was declared operational in November 1995. Agreements were made in 1993 to outline how the force would be employed by NATO or by the WEU. In

the case of a WEU employment, the force would be limited to Petersburg tasks (www.weu.int, 9 Sep 01).

The Multinational Division (Central) has four airborne and air assault brigades from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It is primarily a NATO division, but has been made available to the WEU (www.weu.int, 9 Sep 01).

Two amphibious forces available to the WEU include the United Kingdom-Netherlands amphibious force, centered on a British brigade and comprising some 6,500 troops (Editors, *Military Technology*, April 2000); and the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force, which is another non-standing force whose amphibious naval elements would retain national lines of command if employed (www.weu.int, 9 Sep 01).

The EUROFOR is comprised of French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese forces headquartered in Florence, Italy. This force is designed to provide rapid-reaction light forces and has approximately 14,000 troops assigned (www.weu.int, 9 Sep 01). EUROMARFOR, the naval equivalent of EUROFOR, began with a May 1995 agreement between Spain, France, and Italy. Portugal has agreed to participate with the forces when they are used by the WEU as long as no conflict arises with Article V of the WEU treaty, or Article 5 of the NATO treaty (as Portugal is a member of both organizations) regarding collective defense. EUROMARFOR is a non-standing yet pre-configured force from the signatory nations expected to act as a carrier task force, or a brigade sized amphibious force. The commander rotates on a yearly basis between signatory nations while “dual-hatted” in his own nation’s navy (www.weu.int, 9 Sep 01).

The 1st German-Netherlands Corps, another heavy NATO force, comprises some 40,000 troops from German and Dutch divisions. Of note is the WEU plan to use the

corps headquarters for Petersburg tasks, potentially using the corps staff to oversee units other than their habitual heavy divisions (www.weu.int, 9 Sep 01).

With all this said, the WEU is in the process of giving its military crisis management responsibilities over to the EU and transferring the bulk of its functions into EU structures. This includes the transfer of its military staff function and the WEU satellite station in Torrejon, Spain, an intelligence gathering facility.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has forced NATO to evolve. Without the apparent external threat to NATO members formerly provided by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies, NATO has had to confront its existence more in terms of practical collective security and regional stability than its traditional territorial defense mission. In fact, the power vacuum created by the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact has allowed NATO to extend its membership into Central and Eastern Europe, and spread its involvement into former Soviet spheres of influence through programs such as Partnership for Peace.

At the same time, European efforts towards economic and military stability outside of NATO have flourished in the context of the EU. While the EU has grown in relevance and power incrementally since the rebuilding of Europe after World War Two, the changes in the past ten years have become more frequent and more significant. Sweeping changes in legal, economic, and political structures have produced an EU that seems to be moving in the direction of a truly “unified” Europe. Membership includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, with twelve applications pending (*Serving the European Union*, 1999). Given the absence of a

Soviet threat, the growth of the EU and its goal of a strong European collective make discussion of the role of NATO a viable question. Simply put, an EU collective defense policy has broader potential to influence NATO than previously established WEU concepts.

NATO has for some time engaged in efforts to “strengthen the European pillar of the North Atlantic alliance” through its European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI), primarily through multinational efforts within NATO and cooperative agreements with the WEU. Today’s multipolar world has made global conventional conflict much less likely than regional disputes. Regional conflict based on ethnic and economic tensions seems particularly likely. In this context, military forces for “Petersburg tasks” will be in high demand in years to come.

For many years the WEU has had international forces available to deal with “European” crises. The NATO ESDI included agreements with the WEU on mutual support in the realm of command, control, and communications, and outright support for the WEU forces by NATO. Staffs are hard at work on the problems of revising existing agreements with NATO to retain viable cooperation for the evolving European forces, with a goal (stated at Helsinki) of fielding an effective force by 2003 (www.weu.int, 9 Sep 01).

To further the reader’s understanding of the background for this thesis, the following descriptions are provided:

European Union (EU). The EU is the political, legal, and economic union of fifteen nations: Germany, Austria, United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Sweden, Finland. The

EU has executive, legislative, and judicial branches in the form of the European Commission (executive), the European Council (legislative), the European Parliament (legislative), and the Court of European Justice (judicial). Additionally the European Central Bank sets all monetary policy for EU members, so while individual nations retain budgetary authority for their own nation, they cannot control the supply of currency or the EU interest rates (*Serving the European Union* 1999, 4-36).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO began with the Treaty of Washington, also known as the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. The current membership (nineteen) includes Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Eight of these members are not members of the EU: United States, Canada, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Norway, and Iceland. As of the 1999 Washington summit, NATO had set goals of establishing a multinational rapid-reaction force and increasing the European contributions to the common defense. Agreements for loan of NATO forces to the WEU were reaffirmed (www.nato.int, 9 Sep 01).

European Commission. The Commission has a president and nineteen other members. The European Council (also known as the Council of Ministers) chooses the president after consulting with the Parliament. The fifteen member governments nominate the other nineteen members in consultation with the incoming president. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom each get two members, while other EU nations get one. President and members serve together for a five-year term. The commission initiates all legislation (with two exceptions--common foreign and

security policy, and cooperation on justice and home affairs), on which the Council and Parliament then act. The Commission ensures EU legislation complies with the EU's underlying treaties and can take suspected violations to the Court of Justice. The Commission manages the EU annual budget and negotiates trade agreements between the EU and the rest of the world (*Serving the European Union* 1999, 13-16).

European Council. Also known as the Council of Ministers, this body has one minister from each of the fifteen member nations. The presidency rotates every six months on a set schedule by member nation. In most cases the Council votes with a weighted system wherein the most populated five nations receive approximately double the votes of the remaining ten. Most votes require a 75 percent consensus to pass, and some require that the votes come from at least ten nations. The Council votes on legislation proposed by the Commission, and generally the Parliament also votes on the legislation. The Council initiates and decides on legislation in the two areas that the European Commission does not initiate: common foreign and security policy, and EU member nations' cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. In these two areas the European Parliament has no co-decision procedure, and the Council generally must pass votes unanimously (*Serving the European Union* 1999, 9-12). Because of its role regarding common foreign and security policy, Council actions are expected to have immediate impact on this thesis topic.

The Court of Justice of the European Communities. The court has fifteen justices, one from each member state, appointed for renewable terms of six years. The Court elects its own president from its membership for a term of three years. The Court ensures uniform interpretation of EU law. It interprets and applies the treaties of the EU, as well

as its own precedents, as its legal basis. EU law supersedes member national law, and decisions by the European Court have precedent-setting impact on EU legislation similar to the impact in the US of its own Supreme Court. Since 1989, a Court of First Instance has been established to deal with actions brought by individuals and companies against EU institutions and agencies. It also has fifteen justices, one from each member state (*Serving the European Union* 1999, 17-18).

European Parliament. The 626 members are elected every five years at the same time. Seats are weighted by member state population and organized by political party. Parliament seeks to pass effective legislation and to control the executive branch of the EU government. While the Treaty of Rome (1957) gave the Parliament a consultative role to the Council, subsequent treaties give today's Parliament co-decision authority for legislation initiated by the Commission, as well as the ability to amend legislation in certain areas. Parliamentary assent is required to bring in new members, as well as to change powers of the European Central Bank. Parliament approves the EU's annual budget and monitors the Commission's spending continuously (*Serving the European Union* 1999, 5-8).

Assumptions

1. The EU is serious about establishing a 60,000-troop force as outlined at their Helsinki summit (December, 1999).
2. The EU will attempt to successfully absorb new states to eventually double its size.
3. NATO will strive to remain a strong alliance even without a bipolar Cold-War scenario.

4. NATO involvement with non-NATO Central and East European countries will continue through programs such as Partnership for Peace, and potential NATO expansion.

5. The US will not back out of NATO and will keep NATO as viable as possible.

6. Ultimately, European stability is tied to NATO and US commitment to European collective defense.

Limitations and Delimitations

This research will be limited by the time constraints of the Master of Military Arts and Sciences program. The research deadline is the end of February 2002. This research will be conducted through the Combined Arms Research Library, the Internet, and faculty at Fort Leavenworth. Analysis of the EU's military force for this thesis must rely on projected issues, as the force has not yet been employed for practical evaluation of its capabilities

Significance of the Study

The stated desire of the EU to field an autonomous military force for "Petersburg Tasks" has potential to impact NATO and US policy in Europe. Despite the fact that the EU will rely on NATO for significant military infrastructure, EU political efforts to assert independence from the US have raised concerns that this EU initiative is the first step towards a weaker NATO. In the absence of an effective purely European collective security and defense mechanism, NATO remains pivotal to the stability of Europe. How NATO and the EU adapt to the changes posed by the EU initiative to develop autonomous crisis response capability will have a long-term impact on the region.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

This chapter presents the method and scope of research, the purpose of the research, and an explanation of the relationship of supporting questions to the primary question, as well as a summary of the body of literature that makes up the research. The research focused on providing the basis for a qualitative analysis of the potential impact on NATO and the US from the European Union's newly emerging rapid-reaction military force as defined by the "headline goals" of the 1999 Helsinki summit.

Method and Scope of Research

Due to the limited time available, primary avenues of research were limited to the Combined Arms Research Library (Fort Leavenworth, KS) and the Internet. The Internet provided access to EU publications, notes from its governmental sessions, and NATO publications, as well as articles from newspapers and periodicals. Both the library and the Internet provided access to treaty information, as well as scholarly and journalistic commentary on the treaties and policies of the member nations. Initial research emphasized background, then moved onto a concentrated effort on the primary and secondary questions. Research was limited to documents published in English, as the EU and NATO are good about multilingual publishing.

Purpose of Research

This thesis presents a qualitative analysis based on current research and topical literature. The analysis criteria are evaluated as pro, con, or neutral regarding the impact on NATO and the US of the establishment of an EU force which meets the Helsinki

‘headline’ goals (the primary question). The research must address subordinate questions directly, and also indirectly by answering the following additional questions: to field its ‘headline’ force, what quantity of NATO and US military resources will the EU need in terms of time, manpower, materiel, and money? Could the creation of the EU force produce significant conflicts of interest with NATO and with the US? How will the EU establish its command and control structure and how will this structure tie in with existing NATO forces? What sort of security guarantees, if any, will the EU provide members as it develops its autonomous military arm?

Linkage of Research and Supporting Questions to the Primary Question

The primary question of the potential impact to NATO and the US from the EU’s implementation of its own autonomous military force can be answered in a multitude of ways. This thesis provides a qualitative, forward-looking examination of some practical aspects of the EU plan. With that goal, and given the limited scope of this research, the following subordinate questions must be answered:

1. How much will NATO intertwine with the proposed EU forces in terms of command networks, and military resources?
2. How aggressively will the EU pursue the economic changes required to develop a genuinely autonomous military capability?
3. What are the potential impacts of EU and NATO expansion on the EU ability to employ military forces?
4. What is the intention of the EU with regards to NATO as it brings its own “Petersberg” force into being?

The first question provides an avenue to directly examine the impact of a new EU force, established outside of NATO, on the existing NATO structure. Analysis of this question should examine existing force and command and control structures, as well as the political basis for both military organizations as recorded by political agreements, summits, and treaties.

Background research sets the stage to answer this question. Examination of the EU treaty of Maastricht (December 1991), the North Atlantic Council meeting at Brussels (January 1994), the EU treaty of Amsterdam (October 1997), the Franco-British defense summit at St. Malo (December 1998), and the EU Council summit at Helsinki (December 1999) reveals a plan to create a military capability for the EU while maintaining existing NATO commitments. Key works include papers, such as *Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia* (Peter Van Ham 2000), written for the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. There are also numerous papers, both theses and monographs, written at various graduate schools, including US War Colleges and the Naval Postgraduate School.

Consistently, the EU has been careful to specify that the new force would only be used when NATO is not otherwise engaged. A more detailed analysis will follow in the next chapter, but a summation of key points of these treaties and summits, as well as a NATO perspective, is in order.

Title V of the treaty drafted at Maastricht in 1991 (also known as “The Treaty of European Union”) specifically established the concept of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for the European Union, while declarations twenty-seven through thirty deal with common security issues and the WEU. CFSP, as established in 1991, had a

common defense policy as an eventual goal, which “might in time lead to a common defense,” and set the goal of establishing practical arrangements with the WEU to forward that objective. With respect to NATO and individual defense policies, the treaty sought not to step on any toes and declared that adherents would “respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework” (Maastricht Treaty 1991, Title V, Article J.4(1), J.4(2), J.4(4)). Article J.5 required the EU members of NATO and the UN Security Council to keep the non-NATO, non-Security Council EU nations informed of developments within those organizations.

Maastricht’s declarations regarding the WEU proposed a gradual process of strengthening European responsibility on defense matters, which would “increase solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance.” Per Maastricht, the WEU would become the focal point for application of the military arm of the EU’s CFSP. The treaty mandated moving WEU headquarters to Brussels, a move that was designed to ensure closer ties with the EU staff, as well as with NATO. Regarding dependence on NATO, WEU members were directed to “draw upon a double-hatting formula, to be worked out, consisting of their representatives to the Alliance [NATO] and to the European Union” (Maastricht Treaty 1991, Declaration on WEU).

At the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting at Brussels (January 1994) the NAC declared continued support for a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, reaffirmed unanimous desire for continued involvement of the US and Canada in European security issues (a “transatlantic link”), and acknowledged the possibilities introduced at Maastricht (1991) of a future European common defense

policy. The NAC went so far as to declare NATO willingness to provide forces for WEU operations in support of European security issues. To prepare for these operations, the NAC directed development of the NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters (NATO Press communiqué M-1 (94) 3, 1994).

The Amsterdam Treaty (October 1997) built upon the 1991 treaty at Maastricht. It called for the WEU to take on “Petersberg Tasks” fully, while recognizing ‘transparency’ between itself and NATO (Amsterdam Treaty 1997, 129). At Amsterdam the EU called for greater WEU and NATO cooperation in crisis management, to include “Operational links between WEU and NATO for the planning, preparation and conduct of operations using NATO assets and capabilities under the political control and strategic direction of WEU . . . military planning, conducted by NATO in coordination with WEU, and exercises; [and] a framework agreement on the transfer, monitoring and return of NATO assets and capabilities . . .”(Amsterdam Treaty 1997, 130).

While recognizing the initiative to improve WEU ties with NATO, the Amsterdam treaty also stated that the EU might at some point absorb the WEU towards gaining operational ability to perform “Petersberg Tasks” (1997 Amsterdam Treaty, 12). The Amsterdam Treaty acknowledged the possibility of WEU assets and capabilities employed on a national or multinational basis, or from within NATO to deal with a military crisis, under agreements yet to be finalized (Amsterdam Treaty 1997, 130).

A key step highlighting national commitment came from the joint French-British declaration at St. Malo, France (December 1998). Key points include an affirmation of the Amsterdam points on collective security, as well as a statement calling for the “capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide

to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (3-4 December 1998, British-French Joint Declaration, St. Malo summit, paragraph 2). They declared that the EU autonomous capability would not undermine Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and would strengthen NATO. Ultimately they called for independent command and control structures, highlighted existing WEU capabilities, and allowed for the possibility of the EU using either forces already designated for NATO or forces that were not. The statement concluded with a call for industrial and technological support for a strong European military (December 1998, British-French Joint Declaration, St. Malo summit, paragraphs 3, 4).

Regarding the “headline goals” established at Helsinki (December 1999), the European council stated that it would “avoid duplication,” that it did not intend to “stand up a European Army,” and that the EU military force would act only when NATO “as a whole” was not otherwise engaged. They also called for the ability of non-EU NATO members to participate in EU military crisis management (Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions II.27, 28).

Peter Van Ham, writing for the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in June 2000, emphasized the sincerity of the EU desire to initiate its own military force. He based this argument on the rapidity of the reforms within the EU to establish the necessary infrastructure (Van Ham 2000, 1-12). His closest answer to the primary question is “Without a rebalanced transatlantic relationship, NATO will certainly fall into decay. On the other hand, if Europe’s CESDP [collective European security and defense policy] is injudiciously managed, Europe may end up with the worst of both worlds: a weak EU and a weakened NATO” (Van Ham 2001, 36-37). This is certainly

not a direct answer, but he did offer opinion on many of the subordinate questions. He highlighted the fact that the EU, unlike NATO, can bring to bear all aspects of foreign policy, with the military as one instrument (Van Ham 2001, 15).

Regarding subordinate question number one, at the Washington summit of 1999 parties agreed that the EU would have “presumed access” to NATO assets should US troops not become involved in a specific military operation (Van Ham 2001, 21).

Acknowledging the need to maintain ties with NATO, the EU has proposed that key NATO personnel have permanent seats in their EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and Military Committee (MC). These committees are to provide the political and military guidance to the Military Staff (MS) as they employ the EU force (Van Ham 2001, 23). Whether the NATO personnel would merely observe or actually impact committee decisions remains to be seen.

NATO has acknowledged EU efforts to develop a Helsinki “headline force” and has continued efforts originally designed for cooperation with the WEU towards forging greater ties with the EU. Areas of concentration for NATO include assuring EU access to NATO planning, pre-identification of NATO assets, and development of an EU command and control structure that works with NATO for those EU operations that involve Alliance members. As of summer, 2000, NATO and the EU Council had developed an interim agreement for sharing classified intelligence (NATO Handbook Oct 2001, 97-98, 103).

If impact on NATO and the US depends on the degree of European military independence, answering the question of the EU aggressiveness to fund the changes needed to develop a truly autonomous military capability helps answer the primary

question as well. This question follows the first with the assumption that existing EU military structures are in need of change to meet the Helsinki 'headline' goals. This change must occur organizationally across national lines, but must also occur economically if the EU desires capabilities it enjoys while allied with US forces. EU pursuit of budgetary changes for its militaries will determine how much military autonomy it should expect to develop from NATO and the United States. This answer will of necessity be essentially qualitative in terms of its predictive nature, but an examination of current force structures and budgets can give insight as to the types of and degree of change needed for greater EU autonomy.

Most of the literature agrees that the national militaries of the EU have lagged behind the US military in the realms of mobility assets, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, precision guided munitions, all-weather strike aircraft, and command and control infrastructures. Some authors expect to find new capabilities through cooperative defense agreements, while others expect that European defense budgets will have to increase to improve their capabilities, especially with money tailored for research and development. Opinions are divided as to how much modernization the European militaries require for "Petersberg Tasks," as some expect success in those missions without the costly modernized capabilities the US military has developed.

At the European Council's recent Laeken Summit (December 2001) the EU confirmed that existing resources are "fully satisfying the requirements defined by the [Helsinki] headline goal to conduct different types of crisis-management operations" (2001 Laeken Summit Presidency Conclusions, Annex I, II.4). At the same time, it concluded with its intention to finalize arrangements with NATO regarding "guaranteed

access to the Alliance's operational planning, presumption of availability of pre-identified assets . . . and identification of a series of command options made available to the Union" (2001 Laeken Summit Presidency Conclusions, Annex IIC). The EU wants to declare publicly its readiness to take on an autonomous military role, while also looking for a formalized dependence on NATO. While at Laeken the EU did affirm an adjusted schedule of contribution to its rapid-reaction force from its various members, there were no quantitative agreements regarding defense budgets.

Full-spectrum foreign policy potential notwithstanding, Van Ham acknowledges that many EU states lack motivation to fund military forces on the same level of capability as the US (Van Ham 2001, 17-19). Even so, he argues that the EU ultimately seeks to lessen its military dependence on the US (Van Ham 2001, 16).

Francois Heisbourg, writing as the Chairman for the Geneva Center for Security Policy, has highlighted the fact that the EU as a whole spends a total of about 60 percent of what the United States does on its military. At the same time, the EU fields a total force of 2.4 million troops, fully a million greater than the US. The quantitative result is that the EU spends approximately \$11,000 per soldier, compared to the US \$36,000. According to Heisbourg, the necessary post Cold War reforms of European military force structure have only just begun with the declaration of the Helsinki goals (Heisbourg 2000, 8-11).

The question of the potential impacts of pending EU and NATO expansion must be examined as well. In the vacuum created by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, there are numerous nations who aspire to membership in both NATO and the EU. With the assumption that expansion of each organization will occur, how will near term expansion

of each organization impact the EU's ability to field its own rapid reaction force? This question must examine potential EU solutions for organizing, training, and equipping its force. In the context of the first subordinate question (how much will NATO intertwine with the EU force), the expansion of NATO becomes relevant to the EU, based on the reality of different memberships in each organization. The impact potential political conflicts across organizational boundaries might have on an EU force or on NATO must be researched. Expansion of each organization only adds variables to the question in the form of additional national interests.

British writer William Hopkinson, writing for the Chaillot Institute of the WEU, offers an opinion on NATO and EU enlargement. NATO's foundation as a collective territorial defense alliance (based on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty) seems to have shifted following the Cold War towards an alliance that provides collective security through military operations, based on Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. While NATO's newest aspiring members might fear territorial encroachment from neighboring states more than the established membership, the changes they must make to gain membership tend towards regional stability (Hopkinson 2001, 34-35). That said, expansion of both organizations could increase incongruence between NATO members and those that are in the EU. NATO efforts towards developing European capabilities and commonality within the Alliance might not mean as much when working with an EU force from disparate militaries.

Van Ham argues that the central European states look for the security guarantees of a strong NATO, which implies significant US involvement. For these nations, NATO has proven easier to join than the EU, based on political and economic variables, and as

accession candidates they will have no say in EU defense policy unless the EU acknowledges their rights as associate WEU members when it absorbs the WEU (Van Ham 2001, 32-33).

Finally, examination of EU intent regarding NATO as the EU develops its own “Petersberg” force will round out this thesis’ analysis. A definitive answer to this question may be outside the scope of this thesis, but already since Helsinki in the political arena there have been conflicting reports from different parties within the EU regarding EU intent. The primary question of the impact on NATO and the US of this EU initiative derives from the EU’s intent, and how it manifests itself. Without expecting a definitive answer, research of this question should provide possibilities for the future and expectations for the future implications for NATO, the US and the EU.

The British government has stated that the EU force would be used for Petersberg tasks for regional concerns in and around Europe. Former NATO Secretary General and current EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana has mentioned the possibility of an EU force acting in Africa or East Timor, and German chancellor Gerhard Schroder has argued for a force which can defend EU interests around the globe (Van Ham 2001, 23). What Van Ham illustrated is the uncertainty and division amongst EU members regarding their goals for this nascent military capability.

Review of the numerous treaties and summits provides political background for analysis of today’s European defense initiatives. As presented above, the emerging concept is that the EU enjoys the military capabilities of NATO, but seeks to augment its own transnational power through development of an EU military capability “autonomous” from NATO. Regardless of European intentions, analysis of the other

supporting questions should yield a qualitative result regarding the realities of this European initiative.

CHAPTER 3

EU RAPID REACTION FORCE INTERACTION WITH NATO

Overview

This chapter analyzes the degree of autonomy from NATO that the EU should expect as it fields its “headline force.” Specifically, the analysis explores the amount of resources NATO should expect to dedicate to EU operations. Resources in this context include materiel, time, manpower, training, and budget outlays. This analysis begins with the basic assumptions made by the “headline goals,” and continues with an examination of the developing relationship between NATO and the EU force in terms of EU resources provided for its force, NATO resources needed to support the EU, command and control structures, potential dual-hatting arrangements, and effects of training plans. From this follows discussion of potential NATO expenses to effectively integrate with the EU. The chapter concludes with a judgement of the qualitative impact on NATO and the US of the “headline” force’s relationship with NATO, a link between this chapter and the primary thesis question.

Introduction

Because the ‘headline’ EU force has not yet been operationally tested, much of the writing in this chapter relies on forward looking thought based on current trends in the EU and NATO relationship. In attempting to answer the impact on NATO caused by the emerging EU military structures, this chapter focuses on the amount of direct interaction between the EU and the Alliance. In the context of command and control structures, dual hatting and training plans, much of this analysis falls into the realm of speculative projection. Only once the force is actually fully developed, field exercises

conducted, and ultimately when the EU force with or without NATO forces are fielded for an actual operation will the actual impact begin to become measurable.

The Premise of the Helsinki “Headline Goals”

To understand how much NATO will intertwine with the EU rapid-reaction force it is important to reiterate the scope of the EU commitment made in 1999 at Helsinki:

Member States have set themselves the headline goal by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of “Petersberg Tasks” as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 troops). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member states should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces. (Presidency conclusions, Helsinki Summit, 10-11 December 1999)

The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) accepted the definition of Petersberg Tasks as presented at the WEU’s 1992 declaration, that is, humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, article 17(J7)(4)). EU efforts since Helsinki have been geared towards creating the structures for their rapid-reaction force to handle the most demanding of the Petersberg tasks, and have taken advantage of WEU planning scenarios to assist their force structure development.

Also at Helsinki the Council of the EU made clear that their new force would deploy “when NATO was not otherwise engaged.” They articulated their desire to field a force which could respond to “the most demanding” Petersberg Tasks, while maintaining

the ability to respond to a “smaller crisis,” such as a non-combatant evacuation (NEO) (Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki Summit 10-11 December 1999).

EU Resources Dedicated to Date

Since Helsinki the EU has made progress towards elaborating the headline goals. At their meeting at Sintra on 28 February 2000, EU defense ministers discussed a roadmap, which included a review of their strategic context, key assumptions, and potential employment scenarios, with the intent of identifying needed force structure (Rutten 2001, section 22). An initial force pool, as depicted in Figure 1, was created following the Capabilities Commitment Conference held at Brussels, 20 November 2000 (WEU Interim European Security and Defense Assembly, 47th Session, Document A1734 2001, 24). Without giving specific unit details, these commitments represent an initial pool with which the EU could create its rapid-reaction force.

The force commitments were subsequently adjusted at the November 2001 conference, but remained largely consistent with those shown in Figure 1. Overall, EU nations have pledged into a pool of some 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft, and 100 ships. They have specifically included support units, such as multiple rocket launchers, electronic warfare assets, mechanized forces, engineer (bridging) units, naval aviation, combat search and rescue, and precision munitions (EU Statement on Improving European Military Capabilities, 19 November 2001).

Germany	13,500 troops, 20 ships, 93 aircraft
United Kingdom	12,500 troops, 18 ships, 72 aircraft
France	12,000 troops, 15 ships, Helios observation satellites, 75 aircraft
Spain	6,000 troops, one air-naval group based around an aircraft-carrier, 40 aircraft
Italy	6,000 troops
Netherlands	5,000 troops
Greece	3,500 troops
Austria	2,000 troops
Finland	2,000 troops
Sweden	1,500 troops
Belgium	1,000 troops, 9 ships, 25 aircraft
Ireland	1,000 troops
Portugal	1,000 troops
Luxembourg	100 troops
Denmark	None: not agreed to defense policies of Amsterdam Treaty (1997)

Figure 1: November 2000 EU force commitments to ESDP (Bakoyianni 19 June 2001, 24)

The EU has also received force pledges from non-EU nations in accordance with the November 2000 Helsinki Force Catalog. Of note in this supplement to the Helsinki catalog are contributions from NATO members: Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary. The EU does not plan to count these contributions towards its

self-imposed “headline goals,” but they imply a relationship with NATO nonetheless, and establish a possibility of NATO troop involvement in an EU mission.

NATO Resources for EU Use

The larger question for NATO remains to identify to what degree the forces committed above are also forces allocated by those nations for NATO use. Significant duplication is possible, and the EU must adhere to its Helsinki proclamation regarding use of its own rapid-reaction force “when NATO is not otherwise engaged.” The EU force pool could suffer significant unavailability, depending on the degree of an existing or emerging NATO mission. This quantitative reality provides some justification behind the politically motivated US Senate Resolution 208 (November 1999), which provides that on matters of trans-Atlantic concern the EU should make clear that it would “undertake an autonomous mission . . . only after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been offered the opportunity to undertake that mission but had referred it to the European Union for action . . .” (US Congress, Senate 1999, S14335). Given this right of refusal, the US Senate welcomed the use of NATO command and control structures, as well as US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to support ‘autonomous’ European action.

So what are EU expectations regarding NATO contributions? Specifically, what needs has the EU left unfilled in its Helsinki Force Catalog which only NATO, and in particular the US, can provide? The 2001 Capabilities Commitment Conference acknowledged EU shortfalls in terms of force protection, logistics, force availability, and operational mobility. It also acknowledged the need for improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as wide-body airlift and roll on/roll off

sealift (EU Statement on Improving European Military Capabilities, 19 November 2001). Other analysts have taken these acknowledgements to also imply more specific shortfalls in battle-management assets similar to the US J-STARS, combat search and rescue, suppression of enemy air defenses, and all-weather delivery of precision guided munitions (Terriff and others 2001, 3). NATO or US assets might fill all of these shortfalls until such time that the EU develops its own capabilities.

There is some discussion in the European community concerning the types of forces needed for a successful “Petersberg Task” capable European Rapid-Reaction Force. This is relevant to the interdependence question in that there is no indication of a sudden emergence of EU forces in the areas acknowledged as shortfalls at their November 2001 Capabilities Commitment Conference. Neither is there European consensus on what capabilities the EU would actually need for a politically and militarily effective ‘autonomous’ force. Certainly the forces pledged come from nations that possess varying degrees of experience and capabilities regarding the lower intensity spectrum of the Petersberg tasks. The identified shortfalls become glaring in the face of a time-sensitive crisis and in terms of higher intensity conflicts. Access to NATO’s established command and control structures, backed by large military staffs, might prove vital to EU mission success.

Command and Control Mechanisms

Beyond forces, the EU has established command and control structures that interact with NATO. The current plan relies on the standing PSC, established by Article 25 of the December 2000 Treaty of Nice. This committee, comprised of permanent ambassadorial level representatives from each of the fifteen EU member states, is the

European Council's primary advisory body regarding European common foreign and security policy. The PSC provides political and strategic guidance regarding EU military response to a crisis (Terriff and others 2001, 2). The PSC will meet at least once during each EU presidency (a six-month term) with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO (Riggle 2000). According to some sources, the PSC and NATO have agreed to meet on a bi-monthly basis (Terriff and others 2001, 2).

Under the PSC the EU has also established a standing military committee made up of the ministers of defense or the senior military representatives of each of the fifteen EU members. The MC provides military advice to the PSC, and acts as a liaison between the PSC and the EU Military Staff. The MC also serves as the EU's official military interface with non-EU nations and institutions (Riggle 2000).

The EU military staff of approximately 135 personnel performs situation assessment, and deliberate and crisis planning for potential employment of EU military forces. The staff is expected to meet at least twice per EU presidency with its NATO counterparts to establish arrangements with NATO for force requirements, and, of course, communicate extensively with NATO in the event of an emerging crisis (Riggle 2000). Still unclear are the actual details of any cooperation agreement between the EU and NATO.

Towards the goal of increased EU-NATO cooperation, there have been regular meetings between the PSC and the North Atlantic Council, as well as military committee cooperation between the two organizations. An initial framework of command post and actual combined force exercises has begun to emerge (Gourlay 2001). Although the EU command and control framework that is emerging imitates NATO structure in many

ways, the actual nuts and bolts of the EU mechanisms are still emerging. The EU seems to have filled its immediate need for functional command and control by assuring access to existing NATO staffs (Terriff and others 2001, 3).

The EU expects both operations without NATO involvement and more demanding missions that require augmentation from non-EU NATO forces. The current concept of command and control calls for the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) as the primary (though not exclusive) choice to command any operation with significant NATO involvement. As the DSACEUR is a position always filled by a European officer of flag rank, this highlights not only the acknowledgement of potential EU reliance on NATO, but establishes a compromise by having NATO's highest ranking European in command, rather than a US officer.

The EU envisions its military staff providing expert assessments to the MC and PSC. Crucial to this capability is centralized intelligence that might come through NATO channels or non-EU member nations. With autonomous action as a goal, this is an EU area for improvement based on current assessments, which describe NATO intelligence channels as a hub and spoke arrangement with the US at the center and other member nations at the ends of the spokes (Schake 2001, 4). With their assessment forwarded to the EU council, the military staff would then develop EU courses of action with or without NATO assets in support. If NATO assistance were required, it could come in the form of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters (NATO Handbook 2001, 101).

The CJTF provides a flexible means for NATO to establish command and control for a crisis. The concept involves developing a headquarters staff around core elements

from selected headquarters within the NATO force structure. NATO expects to fully field supporting facilities with command, control and communications equipment no later than 2004 (NATO Handbook 2001, Chapter 12). In the case of an EU mission, augmentation from participating nations would be the norm.

Dual-Hatting Arrangements

The concept of dual hatting pertains at the level of forces in terms of the European nations committing forces to their own national interests, commitments to NATO, and pledges to the EU. Dual hatting also emerges as a relevant concern regarding political-military leadership. EU leaders will potentially have to juggle roles to their nation, to NATO, and to the EU. A positive outcome derives from the efficiencies generated through economy of force and personal networking. Indeed, at the highest levels of national military organizations dual hatting can increase strategic insights and provide flexibility in crisis management. The dangers come from the potential conflicts of interest, inability to effectively perform multiple roles simultaneously, and inefficiencies in training which result from time and budgetary constraints.

National interests aside, the EU faces the challenge of over-committing its forces and leaders in the context of NATO and the EU as it develops its 'headline force'. The caveat about employing the EU military organization only when NATO is not otherwise engaged provides a means for NATO to support the EU, but makes no guarantees for day to day training and administrative responsibilities. That both NATO and EU forces are not standing forces per se, but rather a pool of national forces earmarked for tasking, mitigates some of these inefficiencies. Ultimately, each nation must ensure the training, leadership and readiness of its own forces. All parties involved also must ensure the

readiness of their units when employed as a task force under the auspices of either NATO or the EU.

The reality today is that the EU nations in question do not have the excess resources available to separate forces and leaders between NATO and EU commitments. Nor would this make sense, given the current potential need of NATO by the EU. At best, if managed extremely well, this might have a negligible impact on those nations' ability to meet NATO requirements. In order to effectively respond to crises with or without NATO, and to ensure effective liaison between the two organizations, one assumes that at the actual military staff of the EU and that of NATO would avoid dual-hatting as much as possible. Research for this thesis was unable to confirm or deny the manning of either organization beyond the chairmen, who are not dual-hatted at that level. At worst, the creation of EU command structures and force pools can only detract from those nations' abilities to effectively meet their Alliance commitments. This argument ties in with discussion on the impact of training plans.

Training Plans

The EU has established an exercise policy designed to develop EU capabilities while ensuring compatibility with NATO. Initially the exercises were limited to the command post level, but this will change as the EU pool structure matures and units are identified in a rotational alert cycle for crisis deployment. The EU has wholly bought into use of NATO standards and faces the challenge of applying them to non-NATO militaries under its own EU umbrella (Skold 2001).

One of the key premises for the EU as it attempts to field its 'headline' force is that each nation will contribute troops on a voluntary basis. That said, the force catalog

established by the Capabilities Commitment conferences provides a planning tool for forces available, but in no way gives a staff a concrete task organization. The EU must ensure forces available to it are trained to a certain standard, and that they exercise as an EU force. Ideally these exercises would involve forces likely to accept tasking, and certainly would seek to hone EU command and control relationships.

Effective training generally follows the concept of balancing the need to train for the most demanding mission essential tasks with training for the most likely tasking. In the context of the Helsinki goal of fielding a force for Petersberg tasks, the EU must plan for NATO involvement in EU training as long as it anticipates a likely need for NATO assistance. This applies at the staff level, as well as to the fielded forces. Given the likelihood of an EU headquarters to fall in on a NATO CJTF, and the axiom that success with headquarters staffs usually emerges from habitual relationships rather than ad hoc arrangements, the EU must train with NATO for maximum effectiveness. This will create an additional layer of training responsibilities for the Alliance beyond existing training plans that meet NATO's own needs.

Costs to NATO

It is difficult to quantify the actual costs to NATO that are likely to result from necessary interaction with the emerging EU military structure. Each EU nation will incur its own costs of modernization, which will be discussed in the next chapter. For NATO, the infrastructure upon which the EU will rely for support must exist independently for Alliance responsibilities.

Costs to NATO emerge qualitatively from all of the above mentioned aspects of its developing military relationship with the EU. Where membership overlaps, these

costs will be borne by nations with interests in both organizations. NATO members who are not part of the EU will bear these costs in the context of manpower, military resources, and training time devoted to effectively integrate with EU structures. Additional costs could emerge in the political realm through the emergence of an EU caucus within the North Atlantic Alliance, and through Turkish demands in return for NATO access. That analysis will be presented in the section on European intentions.

Conclusions

All rhetoric about “autonomy” aside, the emerging reality shows an EU desperate to establish effective ties with NATO to ensure its own military credibility. France, Britain, and Germany, as the big three contributors to the EU’s pool of forces, provide legitimate military capability. Still, this capability remains hamstrung by the absence of key force enablers. Specifically, despite the addition of French AWACS aircraft and Helios reconnaissance satellites, the EU continues to rely on NATO for significant intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources, particularly in the realms of electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). The EU also lacks strategic lift capability, both for sea and air movement. Given a “low-end” Petersberg task, the EU might enjoy some autonomy without the need for NATO support; but there is a large consensus that for a “high-end” peacekeeping mission the EU would be reckless to attempt a mission without the significant support that only the US can provide.

This chapter is not designed to present political discussion about missions wherein the EU forces are put in harms way while US forces provide stand-off force multipliers. In fact, an EU deployment into conflicted regions would be unlikely without significant NATO air, lift, and command and control involvement. Because of this, the

necessity emerges for robust military relations between NATO and the EU, to include dual-hatting arrangements and combined training plans. Despite the EU proclamation at Laeken (December 2001) that they are ready to assume “some” of the Petersberg tasks, the near-term and future outlook predicts significant interaction between NATO and the EU.

Overall, this will have positive and negative outcomes for NATO. The positive aspect of the relationship with the EU is that it provides a continued *raison d’être* for the alliance as it moves away from the Cold War. As long as the EU desires an autonomous capability but falls short and must rely on US support, the transatlantic link will remain strong. This argument remains valid, given the current disparity between US and EU military capabilities, regardless of the establishment of an autonomous European force.

From a practical standpoint, the EU also provides a negative impact on NATO. By forcing the development of European military forces outside the immediate fold of NATO (as had been pursued under ESDI), the EU has created a certain amount of necessary duplication. This manifests itself negatively in the context of troops committed to both force structures, dual-hatted staff officers, and a demand in terms of time, manpower, and funding for combined training. The impact of training specifically with EU structures and missions could divert NATO forces and structures from preparing for their existing Alliance obligations, regardless of whether they fall under Article 4 or Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Without the emergence of significant European military reform NATO will continue to be significantly intertwined with EU military operations. Assuming NATO’s “right of first refusal” and the EU’s willingness to hold to its statement of deploying its

own force only when “NATO was not otherwise engaged,” the development of an EU military still represents a peacetime drain on NATO resources. In this case, the political ambition of the EU in establishing its own Petersberg force, while not dangerous to the very existence of NATO has created a net negative impact on the efficiency of the alliance.

CHAPTER 4

EU PLANS FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION

Overview

This chapter discusses EU plans for military modernization, characterizes areas identified by NATO for improvement in its European members' militaries, and analyzes possible EU modernization priorities towards the Helsinki goals and beyond. In the context of the Helsinki "headline goals" and the already discussed EU relationship with NATO, the chapter centers on analysis of potential EU pursuit of necessary changes towards a genuinely autonomous military rapid reaction force. From a discussion of potential costs of European military modernization, the chapter highlights recent trends in EU defense programs. The chapter concludes with an analysis of likely EU military changes, the impact of popular debate over EU roles and how they might affect both EU autonomy and relations with NATO as the EU fields its Petersberg task forces.

Introduction

We must avoid any division of labour within NATO, whereby the high-tech Allies provide the logistics, the smart bombs and the intelligence, and the lower-tech Allies provide the soldiers--what a NATO official once called 'a two class NATO, with a precision class and a bleeding class.' This would be politically unsustainable. We must ensure that the burdens, the costs and the risks are shared equally. (Robertson 2001)

The NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, made the above statement in a speech given in May 2001. Although it represents variously a NATO, British, and personal opinion of Lord Robertson, it has bearing on the relationship between NATO and the EU. What are the possibilities of EU military reform to affect reliance on NATO as the EU attempts to field its rapid-reaction force? The militaries of the EU consist of

some 2 million personnel, as compared to approximately 1.5 million in the US. Despite a greater number of people in arms, the EU members' annual defense budgets collectively amount to approximately \$148 billion, roughly half of the US 2001 defense budget (Powaski 2001, 2). The net result is an EU military establishment that spends only \$4,000 per soldier on research and development, compared to \$26,000 per soldier in the US. The EU's lower proportion of research and development dollars helps explain why the 1999 NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) report presented the European members of NATO, representing a large portion of the EU military structure, with fifty-eight projects for improvement (Schake 2002, 11, 13). The areas cited by the DCI report for improvement are strikingly similar to those acknowledged by the EU members at their November 2000 Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels. Illustrative of European NATO members difficulties according to NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, was their "struggle to get 40,000 troops for deployment in peacekeeping in the Balkans . . ." from a pool of 2 million in March of 2001 (Gimson 2001, 3).

The question of European military reform and the apparent divergence in military capability between Europe and the US is germane to the primary thesis question. The amount of NATO support to EU Petersberg tasks depends, in part, on the EU's autonomous capabilities. The EU has set its headline goal for implementation by 2003, and now must search within itself for the political wherewithal to come to decisions about funding military reform. Despite the large pool of military members in the EU, many of the EU militaries are characterized by conscript forces with large pools of reservists, as well as heavily mechanized units designed around Cold War doctrine. This legacy structure does not lend itself to the crisis management, rapidly deployable model

envisioned by the Helsinki summit. The EU also carries with it a social legacy of enjoying a US led NATO security blanket, with little perceived need for the capabilities identified as shortfalls by the DCI and Capabilities Commitment Conference.

EU nations are confronted with the conflicting desires to minimize defense expenditures and capitalize on post Cold War “peace dividends,” and also to establish political independence from the US in the realm of regional crises, which require solutions including application of military force. Arguments regarding this conflict include calls for harnessing European economies of scale in research, development, and production, cost savings through down-sizing and professionalizing bloated EU force structures, creative contracting deals for commercial air and sea lift, and finally increased defense budgets. Key to the discussion is agreement by the EU nations on just what sort of military they need to field. There remain many opinions on how much of the US current and future military capabilities Europe really needs to field a Petersberg force. A total solution will probably require elements from all of the above, the question is, how will the EU ultimately tackle the problem?

European Defense Spending Trends and Forecasts

A recent RAND Corporation study analyzed defense spending trends in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy in an effort to capture the possibilities of an EU economic foundation for an autonomous rapid-reaction military force. The study concluded that there was little likelihood of EU economic commitment towards its own political rhetoric based upon trend data, which generally showed declining defense expenditures in those four nations, and an inability to fund the estimated \$24-56 billion

dollars needed to “create” a rapid-reaction force any time prior to 2010 (Wolf and Zycher 2001, xiii – xvi).

As the above four nations have pledged the majority of the troops, ships and aircraft to the EU rapid-reaction force, they provide an acceptable microcosm of the EU for examination. Three of these four nations have shown decreases in annual military expenditures in terms of real spending and as a percentage of GDP over the past fifteen years, the exception being Italy, ironically the nation with the slowest overall economic growth of the four, which averaged just under a one percent annual increase in terms of real spending (Wolf and Zycher, 12-15). The study went on to anticipate slower than historical overall economic growth due to aging populations and due to economic costs related to fiscally managing the EU. Despite anticipating slowed growth, the researchers forecasted increased military spending at a rate which would allow incremental implementation of the changes needed for a viable autonomous EU force. Of note is the researchers’ caution that their conclusions differ greatly from those of defense policy experts in the four countries in question. The popular opinion there is that real defense spending will remain constant, and that EU military forces must emerge through re-allocation of existing resources rather than increased defense spending (Wolf and Zycher, 16-22).

To understand the cost of implementing the EU force, a prerequisite should include consensus on mission essential tasks and operational requirements. Without such consensus, the Wolf and Zycher study relied on four models that attempt to cover a variety of possible force structures. They extrapolated variously from a US Marine Corps Expeditionary Brigade, a US Army Aerial Assault Division, a “top-down” approach

based on annual dollars per soldier for a 60,000-troop headline goal, and a “bottom-up” approach based on equipment required above and beyond existing national inventories (equipment currently available only through US support). To give credence to their estimates, the RAND study seems to rely on the fact that four such disparate models all agree on a cost range of \$24-56 billion dollars (Wolf and Zycher, 26-32).

Complicating the cost estimate issue is the reality that the EU expects to field its force out of an existing pool of military assets. That said, the “bottom up” approach seems the most sensible of the four models given. Unfortunately, as presented in this RAND study, it focuses entirely on aerial deficiencies in the current EU inventory (the model was based on estimates from a Netherlands Air Force colonel). The estimate given for this model comes to \$37-47 billion and is admittedly low in that it ignores the fact that additional costs might arise from NATO mandated DCI changes, costs which would broaden the “bottom up” perspective beyond aerial capabilities (Wolf and Zycher, 27-28). The colonel implies that DCI recommends defense expenditures beyond those required for EU Petersberg Tasks, and certainly beyond the realm of aerial capabilities.

What if Wolf and Zycher are correct in their ballpark estimates of cost, but are incorrect in their forecast of slightly increased EU military spending? In that case, the year 2010 would pass without autonomy from US forces. Alternatives to increased spending rely on improved efficiencies in the EU’s defense industrial base, transition from Cold War force structures, and economic leverage to create commercial deals. Can the EU really generate change in those areas? Finally, how much does the EU really need to reform and update its militaries to create an effective force autonomous from US commitment?

European Military Evolution

Ten years of attempted military reform in Europe in the context of NATO recommendations have not produced significant change. National efforts have been successful on a case by case basis, but their success has still left the significant shortfalls already described. The EU initiative to develop its headline force provides a fresh avenue and political impetus to create changes where previous efforts have foundered (Heisbourg 2000, 3). Key reforms are needed, not just in the materiel sector and in force structure, but in transition away from short-term conscription based militaries. The U.K. already has a professional military, France and Spain have recently ceased conscription, and Germany and Italy have programs underway towards that end (Grant 2000). Eliminating conscription and downsizing military force structure purport significant social change, and will not come easily. Additionally, EU members must bear the costs of joint/combined training and ensuring interoperability during Petersberg tasks (Terriff and others 2001, 3). Finally, the EU must frequently choose between shouldering its own development costs versus purchasing systems from the US or other manufacturers.

Despite a common pledge to provide forces for an EU force, each nation in question will address the issue of military reform independently. Of concern for the EU will be the actions of the primary contributors: Germany, the U.K., France, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. This is not to say that EU concerns will not shape national defense issues. On the contrary, the “headline goals” and the political implications of the national pledges towards those goals will invariably affect national force structure, and potentially national defense policies. The EU will exert influence in the realm of cooperative

industrial and defense arrangements, as well as provide the economic leverage for favorable leasing of air and sealift assets.

A look at German defense budget and procurement issues might help frame the challenges facing the EU. Germany, the nation with the largest force commitment to the EU force, spent only 1.5 percent of its GDP on defense as recently as 1998. Contrast this figure with EU military leaders France and the U.K. at 2.8 percent and 2.7 percent respectively (Parmentier 2001, 3), and the US at 3.2 percent (Gordon 2000), a figure soon to rise under President Bush's reaction to events of 11 September 2001. Of the EU members, Germany ranks just above Luxembourg in terms of military spending per capita, according to German journalist and international relations scholar Josef Joffe, who also noted that it would take "serious money" to reform Germany's military, a force which is "panzer-heavy and designed to fight a large war of maneuver on the vast steppes of Eastern Europe" (Kreisler 2000). Contrast this "serious money" comment with the German government's 1999 announcement of a DM 18.6 billion (US \$8.3 billion) reduction in defense spending over the next four years, the equivalent of almost 10 percent annually (Grant 2000). Although the German government is in the process of attempting to reduce the proportion of conscripted troops in its forces (Terriff and others 2001, p. 3), the details and results of these efforts were not found in the research, and are certain to create political debate in a nation faced with 10 percent unemployment (Gordon 2000). Despite the German political desire for reform, the reformers face substantial challenges in the form of legal constraints, as well as a *volkgeist* opposed to increased defense spending and the increased taxes that might be imposed.

EU politicians and industrial captains have latched onto the Airbus A400M medium airlift project as a means to fill the EU's need for outsized long-range lift, and eight EU nations have agreed to purchase 196 of the aircraft (Turkey has also agreed to purchase twenty-six) (Schake 2001, 19). Despite the fact that the aircraft will not begin full production until 2007, the EU sees the A400M as a solution for its autonomous airlift needs. The aircraft promises performance greater than the EU's existing C-130 fleet, at a cost less than the US built C-17s. Germany, after pledging to purchase seventy-three of the new aircraft of an initial production of 225, quickly ran into funding difficulties (Gourlay 2001, 3). The German government is legally limited regarding defense expenditures, and could only commit funds for approximately half of its initial commitment. Furthermore, the defense ministry was forced to submit a creative financing plan which involved guaranteed bank loans to finance the contract, rather than actual appropriations in the defense budget: as of December 2001 this deal remained deadlocked in the German Parliament for approval (Barrie and Mackenzie 2001).

Naturally, the European arms industry is a major proponent of military reform as it expects market niche, as well as increased demand for research, development, and production. The politicians are caught between a public that demands a post Cold War peace dividend and their own rhetoric to boost national pride through establishment of an international military responsiveness without US leadership. Some analysts have criticized the politicization of the reform issue in terms of development costs to Europe rather than pursuit of less glamorous alternatives, such as lease agreements and civil airlift augmentation. Like many mechanisms in Europe, agreements exist for wartime contingencies, but not for the crisis response mission the EU would like to fill with its

headline force (Schake 2002, 20). Others have called for increased reform of US arms export laws to allow greater armaments sales and development cooperation across the Atlantic (Grant 2000).

Some headway has occurred within Europe towards collective and cooperative economies of scale. The Netherlands and Germany have made an agreement wherein the Dutch pay for maintenance and upgrade of certain German aircraft in exchange for their use when required by the Dutch (Schake 2002, 20). The Dutch agreement to aerial refuel Danish fighters (Schake 2001, 3), while of no immediate impact to the EU force (Denmark has not pledged towards the “headline goal”), sets another good precedent for fellow EU participants.

Also noteworthy was the July 2000 Framework Agreement “Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry” (Six Nation Framework Agreement), concluded at Farnborough, UK, by the Defense Ministers of the EU’s six largest arms manufacturers: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK. As of July 2001 the agreement had been ratified in all but Italy and Spain, where the analyst expected ratification. Ratification aside, implementation details were still in the works, but the essence of the agreement was to reduce cross-border export controls and trade barriers. The goal is to avoid costly duplication of specialized manufacturing needs, and take advantage of economies of scale within the EU towards collaborative manufacture (Bauer 2001, 2).

Certainly there is no lack of EU political rhetoric. Catherine Lalumiere, a French member of the EU Parliament and a member of a left wing political party, was the rapporteur for a November 2000 report on Common European Foreign and Security

Policy. This report, adopted as a statement by the European Parliament, emphasized the need for parallel development of civil crisis response mechanisms within the EU (including the 5,000 strong rapidly deployable police force called for at Helsinki in 1999), as well as the EU role in collective defense reform. It recommended a three-tiered outlook for reform: “short term” through 2003, “medium” 2010-2012, and “long” 2020-2025. The very fact that the outlook went as far as the year 2025 indicates the scope of reform anticipated. While funding of individual military reforms are of necessity a national responsibility, the Parliament recommended the EU fund its Petersberg tasks from all EU members (not just participants) based on a GDP scale, and specifically called for the EU to adopt a 1997 WEU agreement for long-haul air transport with Ukraine (Lalumiere 2000, 8-12).

In fact, EU members have many military modernization programs underway, in addition to the aforementioned A400M airlifter. Some examples include planned development and acquisition of cruise missiles, precision guided munitions, improved all-weather attack capability for fighter aircraft, and improved satellite communication and surveillance capabilities (Grant 2000). Questions remain over the time required to acquire the new systems and the quantities that the EU will be able to afford to field. Underlying the slow rate of EU military reform is the debate over the need for “US-like” capabilities. Because it is not designed for sustained high-intensity combat, the EU’s headline goal of a Petersberg force is unlikely to resolve that debate (Schake 2002, 13), though it seems to have stabilized EU defense budgets outside of Germany (Schake 2001, 3).

The Question of European Popular Opinion

For most of the countries of the region, even in Eastern Europe, international security is now, if a military issue, something which happens abroad, and about which they mostly have a wide margin of choice as to the nature and degree of their involvement (Hopkinson 2001, p.13) . . . Some of the American developments seem likely to be undesirable for many probable kinds of conflict, and unnecessary for almost all. The Europeans cannot afford, and should not attempt, to follow every US lead. (Hopkinson 2001, 57)

The above quotes from British civil service veteran William Hopkinson, while literally representative of only one man's opinion, demonstrate the reality behind current EU military reform efforts. Given the choices available to EU members, one cannot overlook the potential impact of popular opinion on EU crisis response. Despite the existing Helsinki Force Catalog, which lists pledges of forces for EU use, each nation will participate on a voluntary basis in the event of a crisis. Stepping back from the actual crisis response, one can see the potential impact of popular opinion on government policy as the EU marshals scarce resources towards development of its "headline force."

A public opinion survey conducted in autumn 2000 during the Belgian presidency of the EU reported generalized support of ESDP. Issues emerged regarding national decision making. Over 50 percent of those surveyed in the UK, Portugal, Austria and Spain felt that the decision to commit any military force should be a national one rather than a majority vote of the EU Council. 37 percent reported themselves in favor of a permanent (standing) rapid reaction force, and 18 percent chose the current option of a pool of forces available for deployment. While EU members surveyed endorsed a supranational EU force towards territorial defense (71 percent) and "guaranteeing peace" (63 percent), they were less able to extrapolate the peace guarantee category to the specific Petersberg tasks. Humanitarian missions received 48 percent support, while

missions outside the EU under UN sanction received 34 percent, and without UN sanction only 15 percent. Ultimately, the respondents' views tended to correspond with their own national opinions regarding the EU as a whole. Nations who have traditionally resisted EU integration (Denmark and the UK) responded less favorably to ESDP than other nations did (Manigart 2001, 6-7). Probably more of a political tool for EU leaders to shape their rhetoric than a rock-solid predictor of EU members' ability to complete military reform, the data remain informative.

Conclusions

European military reforms, while boosted by the political rhetoric of ESDP and by political and industrial support in some nations, remain resource limited. While EU militaries possess highly trained, experienced and capable forces for Petersberg tasks, the reforms needed to fill the shortfalls identified by the NATO DCI and the EU Capabilities Commitment Conference lack the funding needed for rapid implementation. With modernization plans that look out ten years before significant acquisitions, it is to be expected that ESDP shortfalls will continue to be filled by NATO for the foreseeable future.

EU ability to transform its militaries and budgets towards the British model of a professional force with high research and development outlays will determine effectiveness of reform. It is uncertain that, given the crutch of NATO, EU members will take the efficiencies generated by force downsizing and translate them into increased development and modernization. Further, the ability of the EU to implement economies of scale through collaborative arms development programs will hinge on political debate within the EU over the need for substantial defense spending. Expect continued efforts

towards collaboration, as well as lease agreements for airlift and sealift assets. Only realistic training exercises and actual force employment will determine the effectiveness of these measures in the absence of organic EU capability.

While the political impetus of ESDP gave the public goal of a capable force by 2003, the likelihood remains that the EU will remain dependent on NATO during that time frame for any significant Petersberg task. When asked about humanitarian intervention with respect to national interests, Josef Joffe claimed “. . . And a lot of that stuff is of course driven by the very opposite of coldly calculated realpolitik, interest politics. It's television driven, it's CNN driven. It's the outrage du jour. And there's something mendacious about it, because, precisely because there's no interest behind it, we are not willing to put anything in it” (Kreisler 2000, 2). Joffe argues that as long as the US has the capability, Europe will rely on it. The economic incentives to marshal cooperative industry are there for the EU, but the political will to increase defense spending lags behind. Certainly the EU will continue to modernize its militaries, but at a slow and uneven pace. The US should expect to provide unique resources in support of ESDP for the foreseeable future.

CHAPTER 5

POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF EU AND NATO EXPANSION

Overview

This chapter presents a forward look at variables in the military relationship between the EU and NATO as both organizations move towards expansion in the near future. The chapter begins with a look at the EU decision making process on its Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the scope and timeframe of potential EU expansion. Analysis follows through examination of the impact on military cooperation between NATO and the EU, as well as a look at NATO expansion potential. Discussion of the political implications of certain membership patterns follows. The chapter concludes with a qualitative assessment of the likely impact of expansion on the military relationship of NATO and the EU.

Introduction

Events in the past ten years support the assumption presented in Chapter 1 that both NATO and the EU will continue to expand, the variables being the timing, details, and limits of the expansion. Analysis to this point has established the large degree of EU dependence on NATO infrastructure and resources, as well as the unlikelihood of rapid military reforms and expenditures within the EU necessary to develop true autonomy from NATO. That said, expansion of each organization would affect their relationship. To remain within the scope of this thesis, this chapter's analysis will emphasize effects on the NATO/EU relationship resulting from the patterns of expansion as expected from analysis of the current situation. Key areas of analysis include training and interoperability requirements, command and control, and political implications. A

discussion of the mechanisms of EU decision making regarding ESDP, as well as potential expansion patterns, will help frame the analysis.

European Common Foreign and Security Policy Decision Process

The EU's CFSP falls under the Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers, or "the Council"), consisting of national ministers from member states as both the initiators of legislation and decision making body. Generally a unanimous decision is required in CFSP matters, except to decide on joint action, in which case a qualified majority vote suffices. The qualified majority system allocates votes to each member nation based on tabulation articulated in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (Serving the European Union 1999, 10-11). Anticipating future expansion, the 2001 Treaty of Nice revises the weighting as of 1 January 2005. Figure 2 depicts the current structure, as well as the changes that will take effect per the Treaty of Nice (The Treaty of Nice 2001, Protocols, Article 3, 50-51).

EU Members	Current Votes	2005 Votes
Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom	10 votes	29 votes
Spain	8 votes	27 votes
The Netherlands	5 votes	13 votes
Belgium, Greece, and Portugal	5 votes	12 votes
Austria and Sweden	4 votes	10 votes
Ireland, Denmark and Finland	3 votes	7 votes
Luxembourg	2 votes	4 votes
<u>Total</u>	87 votes	237 votes

Figure 2: Allocation of votes for “qualified majority” decisions in the Council of Ministers (Serving the European Union 1999, 10, Treaty of Nice 2001, 50-51)

The 2005 Nice formula increases the weighted proportion of the top four nations slightly from 11.5 percent to 12.25 percent, requires a two-thirds majority (ten of fifteen) of the members to pass with 169 votes and populations representing a minimum of 62 percent of the total population of the EU. The 2001 Treaty of Nice also contains a Council weighting which takes into account accession of current candidates for EU membership. In addition to those depicted in Figure 2 above, that tabulation gives Poland twenty-seven votes, Romania fourteen, Czech Republic and Hungary twelve each, Bulgaria ten, Slovakia and Lithuania seven, and Latvia, Estonia and Cyprus four each. This results in a potential of 345 votes, wherein the top four nations each would possess only 8.4 percent of the aggregate. For the Council to pass its own legislation in the full accession scenario a total of 258 votes would be needed from at least two-thirds of the

members (eighteen of twenty-seven) and the total population of that two-thirds must total at least 62 percent of the total population of the EU (Treaty of Nice 2001, 82-83). Using the 2005 Nice weighting at least two of the top four nations must agree to a proposal to create a qualified majority, while with the “complete accession” tabulation, a qualified majority could theoretically occur with only one of the top four nations in favor.

Whether this is likely is not as important as understanding that the net results of expansion are dilution of the voting authority of all members, and an increased political complexity to achieve both a qualified majority and unanimity.

Below the Council level, the PSC handles decisions under the leadership of the Secretary General of the Council of the European Union/High representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The PSC and the MC below it would necessarily increase their size and diversity with EU expansion. Liaison with NATO for the purpose of an effective ESDP force will increase as more nations accede into the EU, and could create more dual hatting if new EU members were also NATO members. One would expect EU expansion to exacerbate the impact on NATO described in chapter 4 of this thesis, regarding EU dependence on NATO for assistance and infrastructure. This would manifest itself in terms of increased need for interoperability, and more frequent and/or more complex (more multinational) training exercises, as well as the potential for more dual-hatted leadership at the MC level.

Of the nations listed in the Nice tabulation for “full accession” three are currently NATO members: Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic (Treaty of Nice 2001, 82). Absent from the Nice list are Turkey, Slovenia, and Malta, which joined the accession process after the Nice summit. With respect to NATO, the addition of Turkey to the EU

would significantly alter the current political landscape regarding EU use of NATO resources.

The Role of Turkey

European leaders have realized their need for guaranteed access to NATO resources for some time since their 1999 Helsinki summit. Efforts to create a written agreement were until very recently stymied by Turkey's refusal to comply. Turkey had voiced concern over EU use of NATO assets against Turkey or Turkish strategic interests, as well as discrimination by the EU members of NATO on defense matters, despite the wording of Article 17 of the 2001 Treaty of Nice, which amended the Treaty of European Union to read:

The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. (Treaty of Nice 2001, 7)

While each NATO member with the exception of Turkey had ratified an agreement regarding EU access to NATO planning facilities, and presumably to other NATO assets, in December of 2000, it was not until December 2001 that Turkey finally came on board, but not without bilateral assurances from the EU. Turkey was assured that the EU would not take military action against a NATO member, that Turkey would be closely consulted by the EU in any crisis, and that Turkey might be invited to join the EU force. Subsequent to this agreement with Turkey, the Greek government withdrew its

support for the NATO-EU agreement on the basis that Turkey had been given too much authority, and demanded NATO assurances against any NATO missions against Greek national interests (Schake 2002, 9). Greek withdrawal means no agreement was in force as of the research cutoff date for this thesis (1 Feb 02), and future EU-NATO assurances to Greece raise the possibility of continued difficulties with Turkey.

In addition to its key role as a veto power on the North Atlantic Council regarding support of the EU, Turkey is one of the non-EU nations that have pledged forces towards the EU rapid-reaction force. According to the November 2000 Helsinki force catalog, Turkey has pledged 5000 troops in the form of an infantry brigade and an amphibious assault battalion, two squadrons of aircraft including two transports, seven ships and one submarine (WEU Document A1734 2001, 23). EU membership notwithstanding, the pledge demonstrates Turkey's potential contribution, which, combined with its geographic location and ties to Muslim nations, makes it a powerful force multiplier for EU Petersberg tasks.

Turkish candidacy for EU membership remains in its early stages. While the EU expects up to ten of its thirteen candidates to accede in time for 2004 EU Parliamentary elections, Turkish accession is still unacceptable to the EU; the Turkish government has not yet complied with the EU's 1993 Copenhagen Criteria (European Commission 2001, 29, 11), which encompass political and economic variables. Despite finding itself at the center of the dispute over finalizing arrangements to share NATO resources, it is likely that Poland, Czech Republic, or Hungary will be the next NATO member to join the EU, prior to Turkey. Having briefly examined the EU side of the expansion question, with its expectations to nearly double in size in the next decade, what of NATO?

NATO Enlargement

With the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, NATO has made inroads with nations formerly aligned with the Soviet Union. At its upcoming November 2002 summit in Prague, NATO ministers will consider the admission of nine applicants: Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, and Macedonia (Simon 2001, 3-8), many of whom are also EU applicants. Similar to the EU, membership in NATO for new aspirants is a largely politicized process, which must be unanimously approved by all members of the Alliance (European Security Institutions 2000, 5). Unlike the EU, NATO membership criteria are more loosely defined, driven more by military capabilities and budgeting than by overall legislative or economic criteria. Among other political criteria, “The ability of prospective members to contribute militarily to collective defence and to the Alliance's new missions will be a factor in deciding whether to invite them to join the Alliance” (NATO Enlargement Study 1995, paragraph 75).

NATO's development of its Membership Action Plan (MAP), revealed at the 1999 Washington Summit, provided more formal goals and feedback mechanisms for NATO applicants, which have been useful to NATO's newest members, as well as applicants (Simon 2001, 2). The MAP provides guidance in the defense realm noticeably absent from the EU's Copenhagen Criteria. Both NATO's rate of expansion and choice of new members could affect its relationship with the EU on the issue of ESDP. NATO expansion would alter the consensus mechanisms to support an EU mission, as well as the power balance between potential EU and US caucuses within the North Atlantic Council.

While expansion inevitably introduces greater opportunities for any veto in the North Atlantic Council, if compared to the EU's need for a qualified majority, NATO can take on a mission with consensus as long as no member actively opposes the decision. This difference could mean that expansion would impede NATO less than the EU, as a NATO member might not actively support a council decision but might also be unwilling to actively block its allies (European Security Institutions 2000, 25). Still, as with the relationship between the leading four nations of the EU and its Council of Ministers, it is likely that expansion of NATO will at least complicate US dominance of NATO, if not actually dilute US power within the North Atlantic Council. There is also an issue of resource management by new members with little excess defense capacity. NATO and the EU must both assist new NATO members and applicants; and use the relationship between the two organizations to further national efforts to establish priorities for NATO and the EU (Simon 2001, 1).

Security Guarantees and an EU Caucus

The issue of de facto security guarantees for non-NATO members of the EU, and the potential coalescing of an EU caucus within the North Atlantic Council are pertinent in the context of the basic NATO-EU relationship, as well as a relationship affected by expansion. These larger issues bear on the impact on NATO of the emerging ESDP in the context of the US desire for a NATO right of first refusal, as well as EU desire for guaranteed access to NATO resources.

The question of de facto security guarantees relates to the discussion in Chapter 4: why should an EU government that is not a NATO member concern itself with defense spending when it knows that fellow EU members have access to NATO resources and

could extend the shield of NATO under either Article 4 or Article 6 of the 1949 Washington Treaty? It is possible to envision a scenario where an “autonomous” EU was able to use its guaranteed access to NATO resources to stabilize a crisis for a non-NATO country even without invocation of the Washington Treaty and discussion in the North Atlantic Council. Because the EU expansion criteria do not focus on defense capabilities, it is likely that an expanded EU might not include nations that are ready for admission to NATO, raising the need for cooperation between the two organizations. If EU expansion proceeds well beyond that of NATO (Hopkinson 2001, 40), or if the EU agrees to use its force well beyond the borders of Europe, this issue could become significant.

As for an EU caucus within the North Atlantic Council, non-EU NATO members should expect that the maturation of the EU would produce “European” views within NATO. While national interests remain, the EU might have its own particular agenda with respect to a developing crisis, with which the non-EU members of NATO will have to deal. As long as the EU relies on NATO infrastructure for mission success, it is unlikely that an EU caucus would create any long-term undermining of NATO capabilities. At the same time, it is quite possible that the EU might use its influence within the North Atlantic Council to oppose a particular US policy on a case by case basis. Only in the situation of identical membership between NATO and the EU could one expect political convergence, and even in that situation the economic basis of the EU versus the military basis of NATO would likely generate some differences. With the US and Canada outstanding, it is unlikely to find complete EU and NATO convergence even on the continent in the near term. Indeed, Francois Heisbourg has noted that the EU’s post-neutral (Sweden, Austria, Finland, and Ireland) members will be caught in a

growing contradiction between their non-membership of NATO and the fact that the development of a common European defense and security policy is a process intimately tied to the Atlantic Alliance (Heisbourg 2000, 4-5). The post-neutral nations must come to grips with a post Cold War security environment, in which neutrality is less applicable, and cooperative regional stability has become the norm.

Conclusions

What should we expect from these two parallel enlargements? EU expansion will of necessity increase liaison with NATO. The EU Political and Security and Military Committees and their military staffs must grow to incorporate new membership. At the committee level, organizational efficiencies must suffer, however, at least one analyst has put forward the contention that based on “committee theory . . . beyond eight decision makers the difficulty of reaching consensus virtually stops rising” (Spohr 2001). The number of variables in the NATO-EU multinational training environment will rise, demanding either more frequent small exercises and or larger more complex exercises incorporating forces from more nations. The EU will benefit from a larger force pool from which to draw upon towards a fixed Helsinki goal (60,000-troops), but will be faced with greater challenges of interoperability. The fact that participation in Petersberg tasks remains on a voluntary basis implies that an enlarged EU will have a greater chance of marshalling a force, but must also develop more complex training and alert cycles across its membership to prepare for a crisis. The same growth that will provide a potentially larger force pool will also generate greater political diversity within the EU, which could challenge decision making at the committee and Council level.

Despite the emergence of ESDP, the EU has not modified its Copenhagen Criteria to include examination of a candidate's military structure, capabilities, or budget (European Commission 2001, 10-19). It is likely that the EU's newest members will bring with them all of the shortfalls currently identified by the 1999 NATO DCI report and at the EU's 2000 Capabilities Commitment Conference. Dependence on NATO (US) military and intelligence assets will remain a reality.

NATO enlargement will also proceed in the next decade, although its rate of expansion is less predictable than that of the EU. As NATO increases the size of its staff and the North Atlantic Council, some of the same inefficiencies will emerge as in the EU. Any growth that increases the pool of nations that are not members of both organizations will add complexity to the issue of NATO support to the EU. The example of Turkey and Greece is indicative of the types of international conflicts of interest that might emerge between NATO and EU members as a result of expansion.

Without being able to predict the extent and timing of the expansion of NATO and the EU, it is clear that EU expansion is not predicated on military capability. It is also clear that NATO, through its Membership Action Plan, is beginning to proactively monitor potential members based on their ability to reform Cold War military structures. Given that both organizations are poised to expand, the first order effects of the expansion will be to complicate military cooperation across the Alliance and the EU. Decision making processes throughout the EU structure and at the North Atlantic Council will become more complex, with a shift of direct power away from the US in NATO, and EU's big four in their Council of Ministers. Expansion will make NATO-EU military cooperation more complex, but not necessarily dysfunctional. If NATO and the EU can

increase their military collaboration, and if the membership in the two organizations converges, expansion will benefit both parties.

CHAPTER 6

EU INTENTIONS WITH REGARDS TO NATO

Overview

This final chapter of analysis presents discussion of EU intentions with respect to creation of its own military capability, and regarding NATO. The chapter discusses the language in the source documents and continues with a presentation of various public statements from the governments concerned, as well as opinions of noted analysts in the field. Of interests are reviews of both the stated intentions of the EU and its members, as well as the implications of their actions since their summit at Helsinki (December 1999). The chapter concludes with a qualitative assessment of impact on NATO and the US of the dominant EU motives in this continuing process.

Introduction

Beginning with the Treaty of European Union, the EU publicly declared the goal of a European defense policy “which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance” (Treaty of Maastricht 1991, Declaration I by WEU States). The declaration of the headline goals at Helsinki gave the world a benchmark of EU intent and limitations. Among the limitations were the size and scope of the force to be created. With just a corps sized force, limited to non-aggressive Petersberg tasks, the EU sought to make a non-threatening statement. Anticipating opposition from NATO and from within, the EU tried to add a military dimension to its collective economic and diplomatic power, without completely eroding the status quo with NATO which existed before the headline goals. An interesting aspect of EU motivation is the use of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) as a means to

catalyze economies of scale and increase European international cooperation in EU defense industries.

Realizing their limited military means towards high end Petersberg tasks, and crisis response in general, and satisfied with the security guarantees provided by NATO, the EU has declared the sanctity of NATO throughout many of the ESDP source documents. Beyond the fact that NATO itself has not been immediately threatened, EU intentions can still impact the EU-NATO relationship over a broad range of issues related to development of the ESDP and its “headline force.” The EU has entertained debate about its own autonomous capabilities, about NATO’s right of first refusal, the role of the DSACEUR, guaranteed access to NATO forces and infrastructure, and collective arms manufacture, as well as over the potential theater of operations for the EU force. To gauge the near-term impact on NATO and the US in the context of EU intent, this chapter begins with these threads of debate, and attempts to extrapolate how their outcomes will impact relations with NATO.

Stated EU Intentions

Understanding that the EU represents the consensus of a multitude of nations, each with its own internal differences of opinion, it is nonetheless useful to examine EU stated intentions with respect to its nascent rapid-reaction force. That it gave itself a four-year window beginning in 1999 to establish a corps sized force for Petersberg tasks seems quite reasonable at face value. By specifying Petersberg tasks, the EU avoided direct conflict with both NATO’s Article 5 commitments and the Article V commitments from the Modified Brussels Treaty, agreed upon by members of the WEU. The subsequent absorption of WEU crisis management functions into the EU consolidated

military support structures within the EU and set the stage for the development of permanent EU infrastructure as described at Nice in 2000. At each turn, the EU has moved one step closer towards the eventual development of a common European defense policy, the possibility of such being first mentioned in the 1991 Treaty of European Union (Treaty of Maastricht, Title V, Article J(4)¹ and Declaration Regarding WEU 1991).

This evidence points towards the primary EU intent to establish a military instrument of trans-national power, which would complement its existing economic and diplomatic resources. Successful implementation of a military arm for the EU, if only for Petersberg tasks, also represents a public relations success, which adds validity to the EU as a collective power in the eyes of the world. The Petersberg designation ties into this in more than one way. First, the EU has been careful to associate its use of a military instrument with United Nations support. That protestation of world sanctioned action, combined with the concept of non-offensive Petersberg missions, is designed to thwart opposition to the force from anti-military movements within its greater constituency. Second, recognizing the need for regional stability as a precursor for expansion of economic markets, the EU sought to develop its own Petersberg capability in the face of both US reluctance to put troops on the ground in the Balkans and EU reluctance to follow US leadership.

The issue of US leadership represents the aspect of EU intent that has the greatest potential for direct impact on EU-NATO relations. If Petersberg tasks are a key issue in the Helsinki goals, the term “autonomous” carries significant portent as well. As recently as 1997 there was a French initiative to change NATO’s Allied Forces South

(AFSOUTH), a regional headquarters for NATO responsible for the southern European and Mediterranean regions, from a US held command to a European one. This initiative failed, and AFSOUTH remains the only US regional command within NATO's European military command structure, in addition to the US roles as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

By 1997 the French were also interested in strengthening ESDI within NATO, as opposed to within the WEU (Allied Command Structures in the New NATO 1997, 1-11). Following the December 1998 St. Malo summit, the French were leading EU plans to absorb the WEU (with whom NATO had been strengthening ties), and favored an ESDP within the EU rather than an exclusively US dominated ESDI within NATO (Rutten 2001). Along the way, NATO had strengthened European command involvement by making the Chief of Staff (COS) position a four star European billet, and brought the European DSACEUR and COS positions into the direct chain of command under the SACEUR. Agreements were also made to allow DSACEUR to command WEU led operations. This arrangement carried over neatly into EU plans once they had absorbed the WEU crisis functions.

Despite the modest goal of Petersberg tasks, the EU internalized its experiences during 1999 Operation ALLIED FORCE over Kosovo, and recognized the "headline goal" as a potential political means to generate support for defense reform and improvement within its states. As time has passed since Helsinki, the political reality at the national level has generated more of a push towards improving ties with NATO than spending money on defense reform and acquisition. ESDP still gives a voice to advocates of military improvements and a roadmap for post Cold War transition within

the EU. The ESDP roadmap is not necessarily identical to the roadmap presented by NATO with its Defense Capabilities Initiative, but it does give pro-EU politicians a platform.

As an initial step towards an EU military capability, it is not illogical for mainstream proponents of ESDP to foresee improved relations between the EU and NATO as a program goal. Because the EU lacks the resources provided by the US, ESDP allows it to implement a military option with European leadership, backed by the credibility of US military sophistication. Successful arrangements with NATO provide the EU the prestige of meeting the Helsinki goals, without requiring EU nations to make the difficult decisions necessary to meet the shortfalls acknowledged at the 2001 Brussels Capabilities Commitment Conference. Lord Robertson's caution against a division of labor aside (which makes great sense in the context of NATO), EU troops on the ground for a Petersberg mission, supported by NATO infrastructure and NATO (US) naval and air assets, would be a significant achievement for the EU.

Following the EU's Nice summit (December 2000) the WEU recommended to the EU Council of Ministers, among other things, the following: that it finalize arrangements with NATO for general cooperation and specifically for assured access to NATO resources, continue support of the Helsinki Goal Task Force in its efforts to evaluate the viability of the pledged forces towards the Helsinki goals, ensure EU members work towards interoperability and that they make concrete financial commitments to resolve the shortfalls acknowledged by the Capabilities Commitment Conference, draw up a comprehensive exercise policy, and prepare for an eventual establishment of an EU strategic headquarters facility (Bakoyianni 2000, 3-4). These recommendations were not

presented with any specific priority, nor are they categorized in terms of feasibility for the Council of Ministers as a body. As presented here, they are arranged in order of urgency, with the final recommendation for “an eventual” EU headquarters left as a long-term goal.

Some EU proponents envision formation of a capable EU military infrastructure for a European defense policy well beyond Petersberg tasks. This vision might include removal of trans-Atlantic military leadership and permanent forces in Europe, though probably not a complete severing of ties between the EU and the US on military matters. While some analysts have declared NATO a liability to the US (Layne 2001, 10), EU developments that might provoke a US pullout or other dissolution of the Alliance are not likely. Instead, the EU has put forth ESDP as a clever means to augment its own political power through symbiotic use of the post Cold War NATO. The US is not threatened, the EU makes a show of moving towards an increased share of the defense burden, and NATO is perpetuated, albeit with a new avenue which allows greater EU involvement than during the era of Cold War territorial defense.

Other EU Motivations

Certain sectors of the EU community might benefit from a successful ESDP. These include the EU defense industry, which will use the political impetus of identified shortfalls within the EU military to push for trade agreements, lowering of export regulations within the EU towards collaborative projects, and a general political push for increased research, development, and acquisition outlays. For the EU defense industry, ESDP is not an exclusive avenue, the NATO sponsored Defense Capabilities Initiative provides a parallel avenue for many of the same programs; but ESDP gives industrial

sectors another avenue with which to lobby their political leadership, and potentially an avenue which might engender greater popular support than efforts which might be otherwise seen as a duplication of existing NATO security provided by the US.

A perspective from those on the continent who seek to reduce or eliminate US influence in EU affairs might be that the ESDP represents a first step. If implemented and supported correctly, the ESDP could project EU power outside of Europe and eventually evolve into a military capability which could develop crisis-response capabilities in place of those provided by forward based US forces in Europe. The question of US involvement in “European” interests could emerge as a legitimate question only after the EU improves its own capabilities. Javier Solana, former NATO secretary general and current EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, has publicly discussed use of EU forces for Petersberg missions as far abroad as East Timor or in Africa.

As a political opportunist, Solana also deflected EU inability to resolve assured access to NATO assets at the recent Laeken summit (December 2001) by elaborating on EU measures taken towards the civil side of the Helsinki goals in the area of collaborative, rapidly deployable EU law enforcement (Solana 2001 and 2002). The lack of a final agreement with NATO aside, Solana continues to harbor ambitions for the EU’s military potential. How visions like his will actually manifest themselves in EU-NATO relations will largely depend on EU ability to actually fund its own military capabilities.

Solana’s perspectives are juxtaposed with those of his successor at NATO, the current Secretary General, Lord Robertson. Robertson is understandably more concerned about strengthening European contributions within NATO than for an independent EU

military infrastructure. With that goal, Robertson faces the challenge of overcoming British fears of ESDP becoming a “European Army:” a force in which somehow British troops would go into danger for non-British interests. British apprehension about the possibility of an ESDP which goes beyond Petersberg tasks into a true European army, well beyond the constraints of the Helsinki goals, could undermine NATO efforts with respect to the DCI if the fears translate into Parliamentary aversion to defense spending. More likely though is that British apprehension about European homogeneity in defense will ensure British participation in the process. The Blair administration seems willing to participate in ESDP, according to one source, to avoid French domination of the issue for one, and also to increase British involvement in the EU as compared to British lack of enthusiasm for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Currently, Britain spends an equivalent percentage of GDP on defense research and development as does the US, and no ESDP project could go forward credibly without British support. With these internal EU motivations presented, the British government remains strongly supportive of NATO and enjoys better relations with the US regarding use of military force than other EU members.

Conclusions

Gauging EU intent with respect to its ESDP to predict impact on NATO, the US must first accept the face value of publicly declared intent. Beneath that, analysis of the multitude of international and individual motivations within such a diverse body as the EU becomes complex. Looking at this diversity can provide possible impacts based on different parties becoming dominant within the EU. The EU’s immediate dependence on NATO to fulfill its Helsinki goals obscures analysis of the long-term impact of ESDP

based on EU motivations, as these motives are masked by the political need for mission capability. This political motivation, which gets back to the issue of establishing credibility by meeting the Helsinki goals, says much about EU intent.

The face value intent of establishing a force for Petersberg tasks represents little impact to NATO, as the goal does not duplicate the Article 5 commitments of Alliance members to each other under the Washington Treaty (1949). EU intent to arrange for assured access to NATO resources to meet the Helsinki goals does impact NATO, in that it formalizes EU dependence on the Alliance. This formalized dependence provides NATO with a certain justification for continued existence, but also undercuts EU ability to politically justify its own need for increased expenditures to improve its own military capabilities. Those EU parties who have called for stronger independence from NATO, particularly the French, find themselves currently in the minority of EU opinion. They are faced with their own political ambitions germinating US opposition to ESDP, while they continue to enjoy the NATO security guarantee. This ultimately means that EU nations need not rush to increase defense outlays, since continued US participation in NATO provides a non-European-based stability on the continent. The latter point stems from European aversion to one of its own states establishing dominance or hegemony over the rest. Josef Joffe has argued that de facto US military hegemony actually appeals to European nations, as the US has no imperial designs on their own statehood (Joffe 2001, 43-52). This aspect of NATO seems particularly appealing to states that foresee benefits of NATO action under Article 4 of the Washington treaty as more likely than collective territorial defense, and can enjoy these benefits without spending nearly as much of their GDP on defense as does the US.

One way to examine the impact of EU intentions with respect to the primary question of overall ESDP impact on NATO and the US is from the perspective of likely intent driven outcome versus most critical intent driven outcome. The key here is to recognize that as a trans-governmental body, EU policy comes from its constituent states, which, in turn, derive their policies from internal politics championed by strong individual leadership. Effects of intent are not always immediately apparent, as the motivations must manifest themselves politically before they are effective. This often takes time and, in the case of the EU, certainly relies on building consensus, as well as compromise.

The most likely impact on NATO from EU intentions for ESDP projects a net positive effect on the Alliance. The EU must develop stronger ties with NATO to meet the EU's Helsinki goals, and ESDP reliance on NATO provides one more reason for US military forces to remain in Europe. Ironically, emergence of an ESDP dependent on NATO helps maintain the status quo of US power projection across the Atlantic. EU intent to fulfill its goals in general, with an emphasis on mission capability, versus in detail, with an emphasis on autonomy, acknowledges the ESDP as a political initiative based on prestige. The EU's desire to avoid the criticism of being unable to act when the US is unwilling to commit ground troops overrides EU resentment of reliance on US infrastructure for support. The EU recognizes its need to establish credibility for Petersberg tasks, and will rely on NATO as long as fully autonomous capabilities remain inadequate.

In terms of most critical intent driven outcome, any analysis must acknowledge the undercurrent of resentment towards US leadership that accompanies the ESDP. If the

hate aspect of the EU's love-hate relationship with US military power projection begins to dominate EU policies, the future of NATO as it exists today becomes uncertain. In the context of ESDP one can extrapolate the development of a Petersberg force into a more robust EU military supporting an EU wide defense policy. This would emerge first through successful Petersberg employment without NATO support, potentially well beyond the European region. If EU politics continues as it has in the post Cold War environment, these developments seem highly unlikely at present, yet within the realm of possibility in years to come. Catalysts might come in the form of EU/US conflicts of interest over use of military force in a future crisis.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

Overview

This chapter summarizes the research completed, provides assessments of each of the preceding analytical chapters, then provides an overall qualitative assessment of the impact on NATO and the US of the EU's development of a military rapid-reaction force in accordance with its own Helsinki "headline goals." The chapter concludes with suggestions for further research.

Conclusions

To answer the primary thesis question--what will be the impact on NATO and the US of the EU development of a Petersberg crisis response force--the research looked at four main subordinate questions. Chapter 3 reviewed the degree to which the EU will intertwine with NATO as the EU military force structure comes into being. Chapter 4 reviewed EU defense structures, their spending trends, and reform initiatives to examine potential EU autonomy. Chapter 5 examined the variables presented by expansionistic trends within the EU and NATO as they relate to the primary question. Chapter 6 completed the analysis with a discussion of EU intentions, and how those intentions might contribute to the primary question.

Beginning with Chapter 3, analysis reveals significant EU dependence on NATO to complete the high end of its mandated Petersberg Tasks, which necessitates significant daily peacetime interaction. Ultimately this predicts a net negative impact on NATO, as it provides a resource drain that could detract from the Alliance's ability to complete its own missions as mandated by the Washington Treaty (1948). As to how much the EU

values its relationship with NATO in the context of an operational “headline force,” comments of the Dutch Secretary of State at the December 2000 Laeken EU summit are telling. He felt there was no point in declaring the headline force operational without an agreement guaranteeing EU access to NATO resources. Following Greek rejection of the latest agreement between the EU and NATO, he was quoted by Reuters News Service on the proposed EU declaration of operational readiness for its Petersberg crisis-response force: “We had a problem with Turkey and we found a solution to that. Now it is a challenge to have that agreement backed within the EU, but without the agreement with NATO it is very difficult. We should not promise more than we can offer” (Dutch Secretary of State Dick Benschop, 2001).

EU recognition of at least an initial dependence on NATO resources and the measures it has taken to tie into NATO indicate the sincerity of its desire for operational capability and help put rhetoric about autonomy in perspective. While autonomy for this force and ultimate goals for an EU based collective security independent of US military resources are legitimate desires for many decision makers in the EU, their first steps towards operational credibility rely heavily on NATO. This reliance manifests itself in terms of manpower, training, and actual force commitments. The expected negative impact on NATO derives from increased work loads for officers dual-hatted with EU responsibilities, increased training requirements for NATO staffs to ensure compatibility with EU operations, and time and resource demands on US NATO assets as they train with and support actual EU Petersberg operations. Simply put, EU reliance on NATO will increase workload for the Alliance, workload that does not directly contribute to achievement of the goals of the Washington Treaty (1949).

Chapter four examined the potential direction and rate of EU military reform towards predicting the likelihood of an emerging EU autonomy. Although the ESDP provides political impetus with an EU motive towards defense reform, the shortfalls faced by the EU in areas of strategic airlift, command and control, precision munitions, and other sophisticated defense capabilities make rapid change unlikely. Where the EU nations are making progress is in the realm of transitioning from large conscript based Cold War territorial defense forces, towards more professional, more mobile forces oriented towards crisis-response regional missions. From the Capabilities Commitment Conferences and NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiatives, as well as WEU and various Parliamentary reports, there is concurrence over EU military shortfalls. Despite plenty of rhetoric regarding improvements, as well as initiatives towards industrial cooperation and reduction of arms exportation restrictions, progress will remain slow. Unless many EU nations see drastic economic growth, the very debt structure requirements for EU membership will prohibit large increases in military spending in many EU nations without large social support cuts, which are not politically possible (Van Ham 2001, 19).

Regarding expansion, Chapter five presented the expansion determinant as a function of rate and scope. While the EU seems ready to admit ten of its accession candidates prior to the 2004 EU Parliamentary elections, a NATO decision in November 2002 regarding its own expansion will have immediate impact on the NATO-EU relationship. Analysts have presented potential NATO 2002 expansion plans, ranging from zero, with the promise of future expansion based on more rigid accession criteria, out to a "big bang" option which admits the Baltic states, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Macedonia all at once (Hopkinson 2001, 10-11, 45-64, Simon 2000, Spohr 2001).

Expansion has the immediate impact of multiplying the manpower requirements at the headquarters level. EU expansion will require its security and defense policy to increase the scope of training exercises with NATO towards ensuring compatibility.

Understanding that the US and Canada will remain outside the EU, viewing expansion trends in the two groups with an eye on the amount of overlap in their European members might provide an initial predictor of stability in their relationship. Predicting which of its current candidates NATO will admit is no simple matter either. NATO's geopolitical goals, which led to the admission of Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary in 1999, admittedly favored the political benefits of acquiring those new members over their ability to directly contribute to NATO's Article 5 collective defense requirements. The Alliance complied with its loose Article 10 requirement for new members to "contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area" (Washington Treaty 1949, Article 10) without gaining significant military benefit from its three newest members. (Simon 2000, 2, 2001, 2-3). NATO's development of the MAP and DCI since 1999 indicate its greater emphasis on significant military reforms for future NATO expansion.

Each state remains an individual player, however, and state interests remain which might or might not coincide with the greater interests of their international grouping. Jeffrey Simon of the Institute for National Strategic Studies has noted that many Eastern European candidates for NATO membership are eager to fall under the security guaranteed by the NATO Article 5 commitments. They can not themselves afford military establishments which provide territorial defense against hostile neighbors, but look forward to the prestige of participating in EU sponsored Petersberg tasks in a post Cold War where neighbors are pledged to support one and other (Simon 2000,

2001). This is not to say that membership in a larger organization predicts international harmony between neighbors. Tied to the issue of expansion are the strained relations between Turkey and Greece, both already members of NATO. Turkey is on the path towards EU accession, but will not comply with current EU standards for many years. Negotiations remain incomplete within the North Atlantic Council regarding conditions to guarantee EU access to NATO resources, most recently due to Greek withdrawal of support over concessions made to Turkey.

Ultimately Chapter 5 concluded that the negative efficiencies caused by expansion at the committee and staff levels, as well as from the increased demand for scope and amount of training, could be overshadowed by the political baggage that accompanies the expansion process. States that desire admission into one or both international groups will react accordingly prior to key expansion milestones, and afterwards depending on the outcome. Members with political agendas towards aspiring members will act according to their own interests within the constraints of their organizational framework. The expansion process represents a political minefield for NATO and the EU. If they are able to negotiate their way through, and if they are able to reduce the political disparity between their two organizations from diverse European members, the expansion process can have a positive impact on ESDP and make NATO efforts to support the EU more effective.

Chapter 6 reviewed EU intentions as a determinant of impact on NATO and the US. Multifaceted intent emerges as an important aspect of the EU relationship with NATO, and it follows from the analysis in the preceding chapters. Contrast the Helsinki headline goals with the following: the EU will depend on NATO for years to come, the

EU is unlikely to create rapid military reforms that might overcome its already identified military shortfalls, and expansion of the EU and of NATO will impact the relationship depending on the rate and scope of expansion.

Autonomous action in the context of the Helsinki goals implies completely independent action in the classical sense of the term. EU intent allows one to envision degrees of autonomy as a desirable outcome with respect to its relationship with NATO. In preparation for initial employment, the EU will seek to carefully ensure the appropriate amount of NATO support for mission success. All the while, the Helsinki goals and subsequent political cries for autonomy create a platform for increased EU independence. This political stance will ensure stability between the EU and NATO in the near-term, while allowing an avenue towards military and industrial reform within the EU, which might be more politically palatable to EU voters than calls for the same outside the context of an EU force.

Because the EU represents such a large body of political goals, and because its stated positions represent development of consensus at both the national and international level, intent of minority opinions will continue to shape EU policy. The current consensus opinion within the EU is to strengthen ties with NATO and pursue ESDP even as NATO continues to push for its own DCI and ESDI within its own membership. This is not to say that there are not anti-NATO currents within the current proponents of ESDP, just that they are unable to enact strong anti-NATO policy as long as the EU relies on the Alliance for its own military success. EU intentions to strengthen ties with NATO represent a long-term positive impact on the Alliance. Despite the anti-US undercurrent

that has manifested itself in the long-term possibilities envisioned by some ESDP participants, current reality forces closer ties between the EU and the US.

To provide the proper context for this analysis of impact on NATO and the US from the EU's development of a military force, one must consider that the existence of the ESDP and the "headline force" which it demands are already a fait accompli. Whether the EU manages to successfully improve military capabilities and command and control structures for its force to improve autonomy from NATO is a question which only time will answer; however, the EU will exercise its military structures and NATO will have to deal with it. EU desire for autonomous action, coupled with its de facto dependence on NATO for successful military employment within the high end of the Petersberg mandate, certainly provides a transatlantic bond in the absence of a Warsaw Pact threat.

That said, the EU's rapid-reaction force will create an additional workload for NATO staff and troops, will complicate the political landscape in Europe, and could represent the groundwork for future EU military independence from US resources and leadership, all the while strengthening ties between NATO and the EU as the Europeans move towards operational capability in support of their Helsinki goals. That the ESDP will provide enough political impetus for EU nations to commit significant increases to their defense budgets is unlikely. To ensure an overall positive impact on NATO, the challenge falls to the politicians and military leaders charged with making the military relationship between the EU and the Alliance as effective as possible. With success in that criteria, combined with the stabilizing aspects of providing continued post Cold War

NATO ties to Europe, the overall impact of the EU's development of its Helsinki "headline goal" force will be positive for NATO.

Arguments regarding continued existence of a NATO based US military presence in Europe tend to revolve around discussion of the absence of a Soviet backed threat. Because NATO's original purpose, in particular, the original stated purpose of forward based US forces, has been met, there is no reason for continued US presence on the European continent. To those who hold these beliefs, EU efforts towards establishing an autonomous military capability are a natural progression from the post World War Two and Cold War eras. Indeed, EU rate of progress and success with its ESDP will determine the amount of pressure advocates for US withdrawal can mount on the existing NATO structure.

A realistic perspective acknowledges both the EU desire for improved crisis response capability and the concept of an eventual effective EU defense policy, as well as the current circumstances which make US support a stabilizing force in the region. Arguments for a continued US presence in Europe range from those based on US-centric desires for power projection into Africa and Asia to discussions which address the globalization of the modern world, which render the Atlantic much less of a barrier than in earlier times. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact does not obviate the fact that NATO has helped maintain stability for its members and for the EU in the post World War Two era. The absence of a definite territorial threat provides no compelling argument in and of itself to expect that NATO would evolve into anything other than a stabilizing factor for Europe. As a non-European entity, the presence of the

US as a NATO member could remain a mediating factor for sometimes conflicting national interests in Europe.

The EU initiative to develop its ERRF in the context of the Helsinki “headline goals” does not represent a cause for immediate uproar in the US. Whatever elements within the EU might want to eventually “decouple” from the US, the development of the ERRF will proceed at a staid European pace based on economic and social factors. To obtain immediate political benefit from the initiative, EU leaders will inevitably continue to tie themselves closely to existing NATO infrastructure. As such, the development of an ERRF will only maintain or strengthen the US military role in EU affairs in the near term. EU efforts towards defense policy do bear close interaction from US policy makers, but do not pose near-term threats to NATO as depicted by former Secretary of State Albright in her “three D’s” speech (Albright 1998) (following the 1998 British-French St. Malo declaration to develop EU forces capable of autonomous European action, Secretary Albright cautioned against a decoupling of the US and European alliance, duplication of NATO resources, and discrimination against non-EU members of NATO). As a senior German flag officer recently stated, today’s common EU defense identity is that each of the EU nations possesses extremely limited power projection capabilities. Until the EU invests the capital in its militaries, NATO will remain a primary means of international military power projection for the European nations.

Areas for Further Study

In analyzing the question of impact to NATO of the ERRF facet of the ESDP, the thesis necessarily narrowed its view of a complex interaction. Despite the importance of military force development, training, and employment, it remains likely that non-military

aspects of the EU's transatlantic relations will influence EU relations with NATO. To fully examine the future of NATO-EU relations would require examination of trends in EU and US foreign policy, as well as issues of trade and market competition.

Within the scope of this thesis, as it narrowly addressed the impact on NATO and the US of the EU's emerging Helsinki "headline force," the chapter on expansion failed to address the impact of Russia on the relationship. Russia, as a NATO and EU outsider, does not have an obvious connection to the primary thesis question. Still, Russia has been largely supportive of the concept of EU autonomy from US leadership and military forces, and largely opposed to NATO expansion towards its borders. Russia will exert political pressure where it can within the North Atlantic Council prior to the November 2002 vote on NATO expansion, and will attempt to exert influence within the EU as much as it can towards its own ends. Within the context of the ESDP, Russian desires and ability to influence states within the EU represents a significant area of further study, which this thesis could not address.

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